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Introduction
Potiphar, an officer of the Egyptian Pharaoh, bought Joseph of the hands
of the Ishmeelites. And it came to pass that his master’s wife cast her eyes
upon Joseph and said, “Lie with me.” But Joseph refused, saying,
“because thou art his wife: how then can I do this great wickedness, and
sin against God?” And it came to pass, as she spake to Joseph day by
day, he hearkened not unto her, to lie by her, or to be with her. One day
she caught him by his garment, saying, “Lie with me,” and he left his
garment in her hand and fled. And she called unto the men of her house,
and spake unto them, saying, “See, he hath brought a Hebrew unto us to
mock us; he came in unto me to lie with me, and I cried with a loud voice.
And when he heard that I lifted up my voice and cried, he left his garment
with me, and fled.” When Potiphar came home and heard the words of his
wife, his wrath was kindled. And Potiphar took Joseph and put him into
prison.1
The Biblical tale of Potiphar’s wife stands as a warning to the criminal justice
system. It is one nightmare about rape: a spurned woman seeks revenge by falsely
accusing an innocent man.2 This nightmare terrifies because of the helplessness of the
weak male—in this case, a Jewish servant—and the fear of a justice system governed by
the emotions of an irrational woman.
There is another nightmare about rape, of course, one that recurs in waking life: a
man rapes a woman or girl he knows, taking advantage of her proximity and vulnerability
to satisfy a cruel desire for sexual dominance. Rape, the fear of which terrifies most
women at some point in their lives, is dreadful enough. But then the legal bad dream
begins. In great pain, the rape victim tells of her assault to police, prosecutors, judges,
and jurors, but no one believes her. They suspect either that she fabricated the experience
because she wanted it or that she caused it by her own bad behavior.3 This nightmare
should also stand as a warning to the criminal justice system, but we have no notorious
parables, retold from ancient times, to sear it into our collective unconscious. As a result,

1

Genesis 39:1-23 (King James) (edited version of story).
Susan Estrich calls this story the “male rape fantasy.” See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1140
(1986).
3
In his treatise Evidence, Professor Wigmore of Northwestern used Freudian psychology to conclude that
the psychic complexes of females are “multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by bad
social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions.” JOHN WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 924a (3d. ed., 1940). He quoted a doctor who alleged that sexual assaults are frequently
“charged or claimed with nothing more substantial supporting this belief than an unrealized wish or
unconscious, deeply suppressed sex-longing or thwarting.” Id. (quoting Dr. W. F. Lorenz). In their widely
cited study, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel found that any so-called “contributory” behavior of the alleged
rape victim (ranging from hitchhiking, to dating, to talking to men at parties) led jurors to believe that she
assumed the risk and acquit the defendant or find him guilty of a lesser offense. HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-54 (1966). This work has been confirmed in more recent studies.
See GARY LAFREE, RAPE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, 200
(1989).
2
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the criminal justice system has not reacted to the cynical disbelief many feel toward rape
victims who muster the courage to come forward with the truth.4
By contrast, the criminal justice system has overreacted to infamous anecdotes of
men falsely accused. Three particular rules, designed to prevent irrational women from
succeeding in levying false rape charges, arose in English common law. First, the prompt
complaint requirement in rape law meant that a woman had to complain swiftly of rape to
officials or she could not obtain legal redress for the crime. Henry de Bracton, an
influential 13th century English legal scholar, explained:
When therefore a virgin has been so deflowered and overpowered against
the peace of the lord the King, forthwith and whilst the act is fresh, she
ought repair with hue and cry to the neighboring vills, and there display to
honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress stained with
blood, and the tearing of her dress, and so she ought to go to the provost of
the hundred and to the searjeant of the lord the King, and to the coroners
and to the viscount and make her appeal at the first county court.5
Despite the humiliation a victim might feel about revealing a degrading, personal attack,
the prompt complaint rule required that she “forthwith and whilst the act is fresh”
complain of being raped to “honest men … the provost … the searjeant … the coroners
… the viscount and … the first county court.”6 If she failed to do so, she was not allowed
to bring a claim of rape in court.7 In 1962, the Model Penal Code in the United States
turned this rule into a strict statute of limitations, which it still contains:
Prompt Complaint. No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under
this Article [for sexual offenses] unless the alleged offense was brought to
the notice of public authority within [3] months of its occurrence…8
No other crime in the Model Penal Code, from serious felonies to petty misdemeanors,
requires a similar prompt complaint.9
Second, the corroboration requirement in rape law meant that a man could not be
convicted of rape unless the complainant had corroborative evidence of the assault, such
4

Rape is a crime unique in its gender correlation. Rapists are overwhelmingly male and rape victims are
overwhelmingly female. Ninety-nine out of 100 convicted rapists are male. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT v (1997). Ninety-four percent of all completed rape victims are female. CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND
MEDICAL ATTENTION 1 (2002).
5
H. DE BRACTON, 2 DELEGIBUS ANGILAE 483 (Sir Travers Twiss, ed. 1879). Bracton served as a justice
for King Henry III and as a justice on the Coram Rege (which evolved into the Queen’s Bench). He
incorporated Roman and canon law principles into English common law. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
452 (1998).
6
BRACTON, supra note 5, at 483.
7
See State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990).
8
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (1980).
9
See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1139 (“The rule is unique to rape, and its justification is unique to women
victims of sexual assault.”). A murder prosecution may be commenced at any time; other first degree
felonies, within six years. MODEL PENAL CODE § 106.
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as bruises or ripped clothing that proved a struggle. Bracton assumed a rape victim
should be able to “display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress
stained with blood, and the tearing of her dress.”10 The Model Penal Code turned this
assumption into a requirement, which it still contains: “No person shall be convicted of
any felony under this Article [for sexual offenses] upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the alleged victim.”11 A man may be convicted of burglary or homicide upon the credible
but uncorroborated testimony of one person, but not so with rape.12 If a rape victim does
not have corroboration, she does not have a case.
Third, cautionary instructions in rape law warned jurors to weigh the testimony of
a rape complainant with particular circumspection.13 The 17th century English jurist Sir
Matthew Hale believed that rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho’ never so innocent.”14 The
risk of false accusers led Hale to admonish:
we may be the more cautious upon trials of this nature, wherein the court
and the jury may with so much ease be imposed upon without great care
and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense many times transporting the
judge and jury with so much indignation, that they are over hastily carried
to the conviction of the accused thereof, by the confident testimony
sometimes of malicious and false witnesses.15
Many jurisdictions responded to Hale’s admonition by requiring courts to issue
cautionary instructions to juries warning them to assess the complainant’s testimony in
rape cases with extra suspicion. The Model Penal Code continues to mandate such a
warning:
In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article [for
sexual offenses], the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a
victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional
involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.16

10

BRACTON, supra note 5, at 483.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4).
12
Perjury is the only other crime in the Model Penal Code that contains a corroboration requirement.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(6).
13
Although most people believe that they can effectively evaluate a witness’ demeanor to determine his or
her credibility, there is little scientific support for this belief. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991). See also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the
Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1162-63
(1993). Untrained individuals do not much better than chance in discerning lies under experimental
conditions. Wellborn, supra at 1087 & 1104-1105.
14
1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1st Am. Ed. 1847). Hale was an ardent believer in
witchcraft. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 62 (1997).
15
Id. at 636.
16
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4).
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Again, no other crime in the Model Penal Code requires a similar cautionary jury
instruction.17
Legal scholars and others have criticized the prompt complaint requirement,
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in the criminal law of rape for
about three decades.18 As a result, these three doctrines have been nearly banished from
formal law. Only three states—California, Illinois, and South Carolina—continue to
mandate prompt complaint, but only for spousal sexual offenses.19 Only three states
require corroboration: Texas requires corroboration unless the complainant makes a
prompt outcry to authorities, New York requires corroboration when a complainant’s
mental incapacity forms the basis of her non-consent, and Ohio requires corroboration for
the crime of sexual imposition.20 Eight states continue to require cautionary instructions
when there is no corroboration of an alleged rape, but twenty-five other states and the
District of Columbia prohibit judges from issuing these instructions.21 The days of the
prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in
formal rape law appear to be numbered.
After scrubbing down the foul Model Penal Code and tidying up a dozen or so
state codes on the bookshelf, one might toss these relics—prompt complaint,
corroboration, and cautionary instructions—into the dustbin of historical misogyny,
declare a victory for the second wave of feminism, and go home. The problem is that
cultural dirt from the criminal law has drifted into an adjacent room assumed to be
17

See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1140.
See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 369 (1975) (arguing
against Hale’s analysis for caution in rape cases); SANDAY, supra note 14, at 23 (stating that cautionary
instruction creates pro-defense bias); Estrich, supra note 2, at 1138-40 (arguing against prompt complaint
requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instruction); Rosemary Hunter, Gender in
Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 157 (1996) (proposing
jury instruction reminding jury that it may convict solely on basis of alleged victim’s uncorroborated
testimony); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Paradox of the Fresh Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L. REV. 441, 474-76
(1996) (supporting modified fresh complaint rule that protects victim and restores her credibility, but does
not reinforce timing myth); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a
Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1065-66 (1991) (advocating abrogation of
prompt complaint doctrine and arguing for jury instruction that states “absence of a prompt complaint does
not suggest that a rape did not occur”); Georgia Wralstad Ulmschneider, Rape and Battered Women’s SelfDefense Trials as “Political Trials”: New Perspectives on Feminists’ Legal Reform Efforts and Traditional
“Political Trials” Concepts, 29 SUFFOLK L. REV. 85, 102 (1995) (arguing that corroboration requirement
and cautionary jury instruction are evidence of rape law “‘safeguarding’ men from rape accusations”);
Dawn M. DuBois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim’s Prompt Complaint in New York, 53
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087, 1109-13 (1988) (presenting alternative methods of admitting prompt complaint
evidence through narrative testimony, testimony for rehabilitation of witness under spontaneous utterance
exception); Donald J. Friedman, Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE
L.J. 1365 (1972) (arguing against justifications for corroboration requirement); Christine Kenmore, Note,
The Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape Complaints, 64 B. U. L. REV. 199, 237 (1984) (rejecting hue and
cry and corroboration theories behind prompt complaint doctrine); Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing
on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 399, 411-12 (1988) (arguing that prompt complaint doctrine should be abolished); Susan N. Williams,
Comment, Rape Reform Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Pennsylvania, 44 U. PITT. L.
REV. 955, 971 (1983) (arguing that there is no merit to historical justifications for corroboration
requirement).
19
See infra notes 100-115 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 116-154 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 155-192 and accompanying text.
18
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uncontaminated. Despite the rejection of the prompt complaint requirement,
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in most formal state law, some
colleges and universities are imposing new versions of these ancient doctrines on students
who complain to campus authorities of having been sexually victimized by other
students. Harvard College offers a recent example.22
In May of 2002, Harvard College adopted new procedures for complaints of
sexual assault and other student infractions.23 The procedures stated, “Complaints must
ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely manner.”24 If a preliminary investigation
of a complaint indicated that the university was “unlikely to obtain information beyond
students’ conflicting and credible accounts,” Harvard would likely “decline to pursue a
complaint further.”25 The 2002 procedures pointed out that Harvard “ordinarily will not
consider a case unless allegations presented by the complaining party are supported by
independent corroborating evidence.”26 Harvard thus declared that it would “ordinarily”
impose a prompt (“timely”) complaint requirement and an “independent corroborating
evidence” requirement on those students who suffer sexual assault. It also cautioned
officials against pursuing reports in which the complainant’s “credible account” of her
sexual abuse was the only evidence she had. Harvard’s new rules will not only reduce
the number of successful disciplinary proceedings against sexual assailants; they will
deter the original complaints themselves.
The recent scandal at the Air Force Academy provides a different kind of
example. Since February 2003, dozens of current and recent cadets have gone public
with their stories of mistreatment when they reported to the Air Force Academy brass that
they had been raped by male cadets.27 Instead of investigating and punishing their
reported attackers, the Academy often chose to discipline the female cadets for the minor
infractions they committed on the incidents in question, such as drinking, fraternizing
with upper class cadets, or even having sex in the dorms (referring to the alleged rape
itself).28 Many of these female cadets were forced to leave the Academy because of these
infractions, which ended their military careers, while their alleged attackers marched
toward graduation unscathed.29 The suspicion that an alleged rape occurred because of
the complainant’s bad behavior on the instance in question and the charges brought
against a complainant does not appear to be unique to the Academy, deterring complaints
of sexual assault on civilian campuses as well.30

22

Harvard College refers to the undergraduate program while Harvard University refers to the
undergraduate college, graduate schools, other academic bodies, research centers, and affiliated institutions.
See http://www.harvard.edu/siteguide/faqs/faq110.html.
23
See infra notes 266-269 and accompanying text.
24
See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 278-280 and accompanying text.
26
See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
27
See T. R. Reid, Academy Probes Assaults; Female Air Force Cadets Allegedly Punished for Reporting
Rapes, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2003, at A04; Dick Foster, Ex-Cadets Keep Close Eye on Hearing, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, July 12, 2003, at 1A.
28
See Tillie Fong, Legal Group Arrives at AFA; Probe to See Whether Women were Chided for Reporting
Rape, ROCKY MT. NEWS, Feb. 20, 2003, at 17A; Lee Hockstader & T.R. Reid, Academy Culture Blamed in
Handling of Rapes; Air Force School is Male-Dominated ‘Family’, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2003, at A3.
29
See Hockstader & Reid, supra note 28, at A3.
30
See infra notes 350-369 and accompanying text.
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These college and university practices may correlate with powerful institutional
incentives to deter student complaints of sexual assault. First, campus sexual assault
cases generate negative press. Federal law requires colleges and universities to report
annually to the Secretary of Education the number of sexual assaults on campus and to
publish these incidents to the wider public.31 Second, these cases expose the institution to
potential backlash. Colleges and universities may fear that a student disciplined for
sexual misconduct will lodge a civil suit against the institution for procedural
unfairness.32 Third, these cases are tough. Reported complaints of rape on campus
almost always involve acquaintances and alcohol.33 Irrefutable evidence—such as guns,
knives, or broken bones—is rare.34 These cases are complicated and cumbersome to
pursue, particularly by officials untrained in criminal procedure. From the perspective of
a college administrator, one case of campus rape can collapse into a small black hole,
extinguishing resources, time, and money like light across the event horizon.35
Regardless of their personal beliefs, then, college and university administrators
may be motivated to capitalize on an underlying societal bias against women who
complain of rape by importing discredited doctrines from the criminal law to deter or
facilitate early disposal of difficult cases. If scholars continue to ignore university
disciplinary proceedings as a site for this kind of gender bias, campus administrators may
increasingly follow Harvard’s lead.36
Before they are completely submerged in formal criminal law, then, it is time to
re-examine the prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary
instructions in the criminal law of rape in order to expel them fully from campus
disciplinary policies and practices. Part I of this Article discusses the prompt complaint
requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in the criminal law
of rape. It traces a brief history of the three doctrines, discusses their intransigence in the
Model Penal Code, and catalogs their weakened status in the formal criminal law of the
fifty states and the District of Columbia.

31

See infra notes 390-396 and accompanying text.
Fernand Dutile, Students and Due Process in Higher Education: Of Interests and Procedures, 2 FL.
COASTAL L.J. 243 (2001) (“In the process of enforcing their academic and disciplinary standards, colleges
and Universities increasingly find themselves confronting the possibility and even the reality of litigation”);
Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for
“Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 660 (2001) (“College
administrators are faced with mounting pressure from both sides”); Lisa Swem, Due Process Rights in
Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 359 (1987) (“Students disciplinary proceedings
frequently intimidate college and university officials”).
33
See infra notes 381-387 and accompanying text.
34
See infra notes 377-379 and accompanying text.
35
CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS 92-3 (1993). See also COMMITTEE
TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ASSAULT AT HARVARD, PUBLIC REPORT 43 (April 2003) available at
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~casah/files/CASAH_FinalReport.pdf (members of Harvard’s disciplinary
board say that “a case exacts a heavy price in terms of their own personal time and can lead to frustration
on their part”).
36
Theo Emery, Harvard Faculty to Revisit Sexual Misconduct Policy on Campus, AP story partially
reprinted at Harvard Handbook Becomes Hot Topic: New Sex Misconduct Policy Starts Uproar, THE
RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), June 13, 2002, at A30 (Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel for American
Council on Education, says, “When a prominent institution tries something innovative, other institutions
are likely to follow.”).
32
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Part II analyzes the faulty assumptions behind the prompt complaint requirement,
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions to help explain their rejection in
the criminal law. Studies reveal that most victims of rape do not promptly complain to
the police or other authorities, most rapes do not produce corroborating evidence, and
most jurors are already cautioned by an underlying societal bias against those who claim
rape. This Part also examines the empirical data on the incidence of false rape reports to
police and concludes that, although there are no solid data to support the belief that false
complaints of rape are more common than false complaints of any other crime, there are
ample data proving that actual experiences of rape are vastly underreported to the police.
Part III discusses the emergence of prompt complaint, corroboration, and caution
in campus sexual assault policies and practices. It begins by analyzing the current policy
at Harvard College, and, after surveying other colleges’ and universities’ formal policies
and informal practices, concludes that Harvard is not alone in its use of disreputable legal
doctrines against rape victims. It then analyzes why campuses would adopt abandoned
rules from the criminal law in their own disciplinary procedures. It describes the legal
and institutional difficulties that campuses have policing sexual assault. Colleges and
universities have reasons to want to bury difficult cases; ancient doctrines from the
criminal law of rape afford them the opportunity to do so.
Part IV proposes a method to free disciplinary proceedings from the legacy of the
prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in
the criminal law of rape. It argues that, in rejecting a prompt complaint requirement,
sexual assault policies should allow a complainant to pursue campus disciplinary
proceedings against a student as long as that student remains enrolled at the institution.
In rejecting the corroboration requirement, sexual assault policies should clarify that the
standard of proof for finding a violation of the disciplinary code is “preponderance of the
evidence” and that a complainant’s testimony alone can be sufficient for such proof. In
rejecting the norms of the cautionary instruction, policies should not subject rape
complainants to extra scrutiny or procedural hurdles in bringing their claims to the
campus disciplinary boards. Additionally, rape complainants should ordinarily be
afforded amnesty for disciplinary infractions that occurred on the instance in question.
This Part then offers model campus sexual assault provisions to effectuate these goals.
I.

The Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and
Cautionary Instructions in the Criminal Law of Rape

The prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary
instructions were three adjacent bands in a spectrum of unique legal rules designed to
make the crime of rape harder to prove than other felonies. The utmost resistance
requirement,37 a virtual chastity requirement,38 and the marital rape exemption39
contributed to the difficulty rape victims had with persuading legal actors that they had
37

See Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962 [hereinafter
Anderson, Reviving Resistance].
38
See Michelle Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New
Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 60-61 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson, From Chastity
Requirement to Sexuality License].
39
See Michelle Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law
on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
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suffered a criminal wrong. While these others doctrines were fairly independent of one
another, prompt complaint, corroboration, and cautionary instructions were
interdependent.40 For example, in many jurisdictions, if a woman failed to promptly
complain, she would be forgiven if she had corroborative evidence of having been
raped.41 If a woman suffered a rape that produced no corroborative evidence, a prompt
complaint itself might serve as the necessary legal corroboration.42 A judge was
frequently required to issue cautionary instructions in a rape case unless the complainant
proffered corroborative evidence of the offense.43 In many jurisdictions, then, prompt
complaint and corroboration substituted for one another and cautionary instructions were
triggered by a complainant’s failure to promptly complain or offer corroborative evidence
of the crime.
The history in English common law of the prompt complaint requirement,
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions indicates the extent to which
suspicion and criticism of women who complain of rape was foundational to the
doctrines’ invention and continued vitality. The Model Penal Code re-inscribed the three
doctrines in modern criminal law in the United States. However, an assessment of the
current legal status of the three doctrines reveals the formal rejection of the Model Penal
Code’s rationales.
A. History of the Three Doctrines
English common law required all victims of violent crime, including rape victims,
to hue and cry.44 “Hue and cry” referred to the “outcry calling for the pursuit of a felon,
raised by the party aggrieved” or “the pursuit of a felon with such outcry.”45 Victims
were thereby notifying their neighbors to pursue the evildoers.46
Even after “hue and cry” was rejected as a requirement for victims of other
serious offenses in the 1700s, courts “continued to require hue and cry in rape cases, and

40

See Hunter, supra note 18, at 156. Hale discussed the complainant’s credibility this way:
For instance, if the witness be of good fame, if she presently discovered the offense made
pursuit after the offender, shewed circumstances and signs of injury . . . if the place,
wherein the fact was done, was remote from people, inhabitants or passengers, if the
offender fled for it; these and the like are concurring evidences to give greater probability
to her testimony, when proved by others as well as herself. But on the other side, if she
concealed the injury for any considerable time after she had the opportunity to complain,
if the place, where the fact was supposed to be committed, were near to inhabitants, or
common recourse or passage of passengers, and she made no outcry when the fact was
supposed to be done, when and where it is probable she might be heard by others; these
and the like circumstances carry a strong presumption, that her testimony is false or
feigned.
HALE, supra note 14, at 633. Note the centrality of prompt complaint and corroboration. A complainant
was not credible if “she made no outcry,” but she was credible if she “shewed circumstances and signs of
injury.” Id.
41
See infra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
42
See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
43
See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
44
State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990).
45
7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 464 (1989).
46
State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990).
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held it against the State if the woman had not confided in anyone after the attack.”47 By
the early 1800s in the United States, courts allowed rape prosecutions to proceed despite
the complainant’s failure to promptly hue and cry; however, they admitted evidence of
her failure to hue and cry to discredit her testimony.48 Although the prompt complaint
requirement waned in 1800s, a victim’s failure to promptly complain remained powerful
evidence that an alleged rape did not occur. Courts still accepted the common law notion
that a complainant who was making a truthful allegation of rape would promptly cry
out.49 For example, in 1900, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The natural instinct of a female thus outraged and injured prompts her to
disclose the occurrence, at the earliest opportunity, to a relative or friend
who naturally has the deepest interest in her welfare; and the absence of
such a disclosure tends to discredit her as a witness, and may raise an
inference against the truth of the charge.50
Until the early 1980s, courts continued to rely on the notion that a victim who did not
promptly complain was fabricating the accusation.51
In contrast to the early prompt complaint requirement, English common law did
not require corroboration for a rape prosecution to proceed.52 In explaining the lack of
such a requirement, Sir Matthew Hale stated: “The party ravished may give evidence
upon oath and is in law a competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and
how far she is to be believed, must be left to the jury.”53 In his leading treatise on
evidence, Prof. John Wigmore explained, “At common law, the testimony of the
prosecutrix or injured person, in the trial of all offences against the chastity of women,
was alone sufficient evidence to support a conviction; neither a second witness nor
corroborating circumstances were necessary.”54
The first mention of the value of corroborative evidence in the United States in a
published appeal of a rape case was in 1875 in Boddie v. State.55 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Alabama indicated its preference for corroborative evidence in rape
cases, but did not make corroboration a prerequisite. The court stated: “No principal of
law forbids a conviction on her uncorroborated testimony, though she is wanting in
chastity, if the jury is satisfied of its truth.”56 According to this court, if the complainant
could not present corroborative evidence, her testimony should be more closely
scrutinized, but if, after such scrutiny, the jury found the testimony credible, the jury
could convict.57 Several jurisdictions followed the Boddie analysis in developing rules
47
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Id.
49
Id.
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State v. Neel, 60 P. 510, 511 (Utah 1900).
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See Hill, 578 A.2d at 375-76.
52
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HALE, supra note 14, at 635.
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WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 342 (emphasis in original).
55
52 Ala. 395, 398 (1875).
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by statute and case law that corroboration was not required, but in its absence, the judge
should issue cautionary instructions warning the jury that the complainant’s testimony
should be more closely scrutinized.58
In 1886, the New York legislature became the first to enact a corroboration
requirement for the prosecution of rape,59 a provision designed, it was stated, to protect
the defendant from an “untruthful, dishonest, or vicious complainant.”60 The statute read:
“No conviction can be had for abduction, compulsory marriage, rape, or defilement upon
the testimony of the female abducted, compelled or defiled, unsupported by other
evidence.”61 At New York’s lead, a number of other jurisdictions began requiring
corroborative evidence in rape cases.62
One of the first courts to impose such a requirement was the Supreme Court of
Georgia. In 1904, the court asserted, contrary to the historical record:
The law is well established, since the time of Lord Hale, that a man shall
not be convicted of rape on the testimony of the woman alone, unless there
are some concurrent circumstances which tend to corroborate her
evidence.63
Underlying the Georgia court’s decision to impose a corroboration requirement was its
concern for false accusers. The court stated: “Without [a corroboration requirement],
every man is in danger of being prosecuted and convicted on the testimony of a base
woman in whose testimony there is no truth. The man is powerless.”64 The court gave
examples of evidence that would satisfy the corroboration requirement: “some outcry or
evidence that she told of the injury promptly, or her clothing was torn or disarranged, or
her person showed signs of violence, or there were other circumstances which tend to
corroborate her story.”65 A prompt complaint thus could function as corroborative
evidence.
58

See Curby v. Terr., 42 Pac. 953 (Ariz. 1895); People v. Keith, 75 Pac. 304, 305 (Cal. 1904); People v.
Polak, 196 N.E. 513 (Ill. 1935); State v. Anderson, 59 Pac. 180 (Ida. 1899); Ashbire v. State, 158 N.E. 227
(Ind. 1927); Ex parte Ledington, 192 Pac. 595 (Okl. 1920); Com. v. Oyler, 197 A. 508 (Pa. 1938);
Addington v. Com., 170 S.E. 565 (Va. 1933); O’Boyle v. State, 75 N.W. 989 (Wis. 1898); Strand v. State,
252 Pac. 1030 (Wyo. 1927). See also Doyle v. State, 39 Fla. 155, 162 (1897) (holding that there is no law
requiring corroboration in order for jury to convict defendant of rape, although court may instruct jury to
view victim’s testimony with extreme scrutiny); Monroe v. State, 13 So. 884 (Miss. 1893) (holding that
while corroboration is not required, uncorroborated testimony of victim should be closely scrutinized for
credibility and truthfulness).
59
See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1367.
60
People v. Yannucci, 15 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1939) (dictum), rev’d on other grounds,
238 N.Y. 546 (1940).
61
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Kings County 1962) (holding that victim’s pregnancy was not sufficient corroboration); Lore v. Smith, 256
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People v. Perez, 269 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 1966) (holding that corroboration requirement
could not be satisfied by confession from defendant).
62
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By the early 1970s, seven jurisdictions maintained a rule, either by statute or case
law, requiring corroboration of a rape complainant’s testimony.66 By contrast, twentyfive states had rejected such a requirement. 67 In 1973, for example, the Pennsylvania
rape code was amended to state: “The testimony of a complainant need not be
corroborated in prosecutions under this chapter.”68
66

See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1367. Five jurisdictions—Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, New York, and the
Virgin Islands—imposed the corroboration requirement by enacting legislation, and the District of
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legislation. Id. at n.13-14.
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(S.C. 1946) (dictum); King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Tenn. 1962); State v. Hodges, 381 P.2d 81, 82
(Utah 1963); State v. Thomas, 324 P.2d 821, 822 (Wash. 1958) (dictum); Tway v. State, 50 P. 188-189
(Wyo. 1897) (dictum)).
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when the victim was a minor. Id. at n.18. Additionally, ten other states required corroborating evidence
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“must be scrutinized and analyzed with great care”); Bryant v. State, 478 P.2d 907, 909 (Okl. Cr. 1970)
(corroboration is not necessary if testimony is “not inherently improbable or unworthy of credence”);
Commonwealth v. Kretezitis, 169 A. 417, 418 (Pa. 1933) (corroboration is not required unless testimony “is
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Beacraft, 30 S.E.2d 541, 544 (W.Va. 1944) (corroboration is not
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JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 2.42 at 101 (Clifford S. Fishman, ed. 1992).
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Cautionary instructions in the English common law of rape arose out of
statements made by Hale in the 17th century.69 As a result of the conviction and
execution of one rape defendant, Hale wrote, “some malicious people seeing how easy it
was to make out such an accusation, and how difficult it was for the party accused to
clear himself” brought forth “many indictments of rapes, wherein the parties accused
with some difficulty escaped.”70 Hale concluded by warning:
I only mention these instances that we may be the more cautious upon
trials of this nature, wherein the court and the jury may with so much ease
be imposed upon without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the
offense many times transporting the judge and jury with so much
indignation, that they are over hastily carried to the conviction of the
accused thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of malicious and
false witnesses.71
Hale’s warning is comprehensible in light of the fact that, at the time he wrote, criminal
defendants lacked the presumption of innocence, the standard of proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and other fundamental trial rights that the modern criminal justice
system guarantees.72
Hale’s cautionary warning about rape complainants entered both the culture and
common law of England and immigrated to the American legal system.73 Exactly when
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See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 254 (Cal. 1975).
HALE, supra note 14, at 636. One example involved a 63-year-old “antient wealthy man” and a fourteenyear-old girl who accused him of rape. The man’s defense was that he was “afflicted with a rupture so
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confirmed “that it was impossible he should have to do with any woman in that kind, much less to commit
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cautionary jury instructions in rape trials entered American law is unclear; however, by
1856 the California Supreme Court stated:
From the days of Lord Hale to the present time, no case has ever gone to
the jury upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, unsustained by facts
and circumstances corroborating it, without the Court warning them of the
danger of a conviction on such testimony.74
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, courts cited Hale’s warnings of “the confident
testimony sometimes of malicious and false witnesses” to justify requiring instructions
cautioning juries to weigh rape complainants’ testimony with extra suspicion.75 Hale’s
concern with false accusers thus resonated with both legislatures and judges.
B. Model Penal Code on the Three Doctrines
When the Model Penal Code was initially drafted in 1962, no jurisdiction
continued to bar a rape prosecution for a lack of prompt complaint.76 Nevertheless, the
drafters of the Model Penal Code formulated the prompt complaint rule as a strict statute
of limitations for sexual offense complaints.77 That rule remains in the current version of
the Code:
Prompt Complaint. No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under
this Article [for sexual offenses] unless the alleged offense was brought to
the notice of public authority within [3] months of its occurrence….78
Therefore, no prosecutor may initiate a case against a defendant for rape, gross sexual
imposition, deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition, corruption of minors and
seduction, sexual assault, or indecent exposure unless the victim made a complaint to
authorities within three months of the occurrence.79
Under the Model Penal Code, a murder prosecution may be commenced at any
time; other first degree felonies within six years; all other felonies within three years;
misdemeanors within two years; and petty misdemeanors within six months.80 The three-
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month prompt complaint rule in the Model Penal Code, therefore, places forcible rape
and other sexual offenses at about half the level of shoplifting.81
The Commentary to the 1962 Model Penal Code analyzed the prompt complaint
requirement in this way:
The possibility that pregnancy might change a willing participant in the
sex act into a vindictive complainant, as well as the sound reasoning that
one who has, in fact, been subjected to an act of violence will not delay in
bringing the offense to the attention of the authorities, are sufficient
grounds for setting some time limit upon the right to complain. Likewise,
the dangers of blackmail or psychopathy of the complainant make
objective standards imperative.82
By 1980, the Model Penal Code’s Commentary had modified its defense:
The requirement of prompt complaint springs in part from a fear that
unwanted pregnancy or bitterness at a relationship gone sour might
convert a willing participant in sexual relations into a vindictive
complainant. Barring prosecution if no report is made within a reasonable
time is one way of guarding against such fabrication. Perhaps more
importantly, the provision limits the opportunity for blackmailing another
by threatening to bring a criminal charge of sexual aggression.83
Both the 1962 and 1980 commentaries thus relied on the fear of a false accuser to justify
the prompt complaint rule.84
The Model Penal Code also includes a corroboration requirement for all sexual
felonies.85 It states: “No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Article [for
sexual offenses] upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim.”86 Therefore,
no person may be convicted of the felonies of rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate
sexual intercourse by force or imposition, corruption of minors less than 16 years old, or
seduction unless the complainant can corroborate her testimony with other evidence.87 A
man may be convicted of robbery or assault upon the credible but uncorroborated
testimony of one person, but not so with rape.
The Commentary to the Model Penal Code argues that the “most persuasive”
justification for the corroboration requirement, like the prompt complaint requirement, “is
the difficulty of defending against false accusation of a sexual offense.”88 The
Commentary continues: “In no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that
81
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under other circumstances may be welcomed by the ‘victim.’”89 When proof comes
down to conflicting accounts between the complainant and the defendant, “the
corroboration requirement is an attempt to skew resolution of such disputes in favor of
the defendant.”90 The Commentary insists:
In short, the corroboration requirement should not be understood as an
effort to discount female testimony or as an unsympathetic understanding
of the female experience with sexual aggression. It is, rather, only a
particular implementation of the general policy that uncertainty should be
resolved in favor of the accused.91
The only other time that the Model Penal Code implements “the general policy that
uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the accused” with this peculiar requirement of
corroboration, however, is for the crime of perjury.92 As the only statutory analogy to
sexual offenses in terms of corroboration, perjury—the crime of making a false
statement—is particularly revealing of the Model Penal Code’s concern that women
falsely claim rape. For all other crimes, the rule of lenity and the standard of proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt satisfies the “general policy that uncertainty should be
resolved in favor of the accused.”93
The Model Penal Code also includes special cautionary jury instructions that
judges must administer in prosecutions for any sexual offense.94 The Code indicates:
In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article [for
sexual offenses], the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a
victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional
involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.95
The Commentary to the 1962 Code analyzed the cautionary instruction in this way:
A general caution to the authorities against convicting on the bare
testimony of the prosecutrix may be desirable in view of the probable
special psychological involvement, conscious or unconscious, of judges
and jurors in sex offenses charged against others. The only rational
alternative would be to require corroboration as to every element of the
crime, since there is no reason to believe that the complainant is more
likely to lie or deceive herself on one point rather than another. A
requirement as broad as that would impose an impracticable burden on the
prosecutor.96
89
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The Commentary thereby contrasted two possible legal rules in sexual offense cases in
light of the conscious or unconscious “special psychological involvement” of both judges
and jurors in offenses of a sexual nature. First, courts could require corroboration of
every element of the crime because “there is no reason to believe that the complainant is
more likely to lie or deceive herself on one point rather than another.”97 This rule was
rejected, however, as posing insurmountable obstacles for the state. Second, courts could
issue cautionary instructions to warn jurors against the “bare testimony” of a potentially
lying or self-delusional woman who complains of rape.98 This rule was accepted as
superior to its alternative. The two alternatives reveal the interplay between the
corroboration requirement and cautionary instructions in rape law. Both are attempts to
address the extraordinary problem in sexual offense crimes that the complainant might
“lie or deceive herself.”99
Interestingly, it is unclear who is more at risk of suffering from feeling an
irrational “involvement” in the crime—victims or judges and jurors. The Model Penal
Code’s cautionary instruction itself warns against the “emotional involvement” of the
“complaining witness,” while the 1962 Commentary warns against the “special
psychological involvement” of judges and jurors. In any case, by 1980, the Code’s
drafters deleted their involved defense of the instruction in the Commentary, although the
cautionary instruction itself remained.
C. Current Law on the Three Doctrines
Despite the vigor with which the Model Penal Code continues to embrace the
prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions for
sexual offenses, the vast majority of American jurisdictions have formally spurned these
three doctrines. A prompt complaint requirement, for example, remains today in only
three states—California, Illinois and South Carolina—and in those jurisdictions it applies
only to spousal sexual offenses.100 The California code indicates:
no prosecution shall be commenced [for spousal rape] unless the violation
was reported to medical personnel, a member of the clergy, an attorney, a
shelter representative, a counselor, a judicial officer, a rape crisis agency,
a prosecuting agency, a law enforcement officer, or a firefighter within
one year after the date of the violation. This reporting requirement shall
not apply if the victim’s allegation of the offense is corroborated by
independent evidence that would otherwise be admissible during trial.101
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In California, therefore, failure to complain within one year of spousal rape may be offset
by corroborating evidence of the offense. There is no prompt complaint requirement for
non-spousal sexual offenses in California.102
Illinois has adopted a modified version of the Model Penal Code rule on prompt
complaint and applied it to spousal offenses as well:
Prosecution of a spouse of a victim under this subsection for any violation
by the victim’s spouse of [criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse or aggravated criminal sexual abuse]
is barred unless the victim reported such offense to a law enforcement
agency or the State’s Attorney’s office within 30 days after the offense
was committed, except when the court finds good cause for the delay.103
The thirty-day complaint provision is substantially more restrictive than California’s time
frame of one year, although it contains a “good cause” exception.104 There is also no
prompt complaint requirement for non-spousal sexual offenses in Illinois.105
The South Carolina code for sexual battery provides:
The offending spouse’s conduct must be reported to appropriate law
enforcement authorities within thirty days in order for that spouse to be
prosecuted for this offense.106
South Carolina is even stricter than Illinois because it requires a complaint within thirty
days but does not provide a “good cause” exception.107 Like California and Illinois,
South Carolina’s code does not require a prompt complaint for non-spousal sexual
offenses.108
Not only is prompt complaint for sexual offenses rarely formally required in
contemporary law, a modern “fresh complaint” doctrine allows courts to admit evidence
that a complainant promptly reported her victimization to bolster her testimony.109 In
State v. Hill,110 the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the common law requirement
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of a prompt complaint, but concluded that a court could still admit evidence of a prompt
complaint where it existed:
If we were to eliminate the fresh-complaint rule, rape victims would suffer
whenever members of the jury held prejudices that women who do not
complain have not really been raped.... Hence, until there is a clearer
understanding of the perception of rape and its women victims, we think
that the better solution is to allow fresh-complaint testimony to be
admitted.111
As a result of similar analysis, states now usually allow for the admission of the fact of a
rape victim’s prompt complaint to corroborate the victim’s testimony.112 For example,
the Virginia code states: “in any prosecution for criminal sexual assault . . . the fact that
the person injured made complaint of the offense recently after commission of the
offense is admissible, not as independent evidence of the offense, but for the purpose of
corroborating the testimony of the complaining witness.”113 Pennsylvania’s criminal
code states:
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1961); State v. Robertson, 89 La. Ann. 618 (1886); State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385 (Me. 1991); State v.
Werner, 489 A.2d 1119 (Md. 1985); Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. 1992); People v.
Taylor, 239 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. App. 1976); State v. Blohm, N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1979); Carr v. State, 208
So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968); State v. Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. App. 1983); State v. Peres, 71 P. 162
(1903); State v. Daniels, 388 N.W.2d 446 (Neb. 1986); State v. Campbell, 17 P. 620 (Nev. 1888); State v.
Lynch, 45 A.2d 885 (N.H. 1946); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990); State v. Baca, 242 P.2d 1002
(N.M. 1952); People v. McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Freeman, 5 S.E. 921 (N.C. 1888);
State v. Gebhard, 13 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1944); Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio 593 (1848); State v. Brown, 1977
Ohio App. LEXIS 9839 (1977); Roberts v. State, 194 P.2d 219 (Okla. Crim. 1948); Statev. Campbell, 705
P.2d 694 (Ore. 1985); Commonwealth v. Green, A.2d 371 (Pa. 1979); State v. Russo, 142 A. 543 (R.I.
1928); Simpkins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 142 (S.C. 1991); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545 (S.D. 1971); State
v.Kendricks, 891 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1994); Vera v. State, 709 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State
v.Martinez, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958); Statev. Willett, 62 A. 48 (Vt. 1905); Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 66
S.E.2d 854 (Va. 1951); State v. Ferguson, 667 P.2d 68 (Wash. 1983); State v. Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198
(W.Va. 1985); Hannon v. State, 36 N.W. 1 (Wis. 1888); Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979).
113
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.2 (West 2002). Virginia courts have said that the only time constraint is,
“the complaint have been made without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence
of the offense.” Id. The Court of Appeals of Virginia has identified possible reasonable explanations for
delay, including fear of disbelief by others and fear of threat of further harm by the assailant. Whether to
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Prompt reporting to public authority is not required in a prosecution under
this chapter: Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence of the
complainant’s failure to promptly report the crime if such evidence would
be admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.114
The rule in most jurisdictions, then, is that evidence of prompt complaint may be
admitted to bolster the victim’s testimony and the defendant may attack its absence to
discredit her testimony.115
admit the complaint is a matter for the court, but once admitted, the timeliness of the complaint is a matter
for the jury to consider when weighing evidence, including the credibility of the prosecutrix.
In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia examined the fresh complaint doctrine
in Battle v. U.S, 630 A.2d 211 (D.C.Cir. 1993). The court reasoned that the fresh complaint doctrine was
necessary for the benefit of the complainant for several reasons:
First, evidence of a complaint of rape negates jurors’ assumptions that if there is no
evidence of a complaint, no complaint was made... Second, such evidence negates
prejudices held by some jurors by showing that the victim behaved as society
traditionally has expected sexual assault victims to act, i.e., by promptly telling someone
of the crime...Third, such evidence rebuts an implied charge of recent fabrication, which
springs from some jurors’ assumptions that sexual offense victims are generally lying and
that the victim's failure to report the crime promptly is inconsistent with the victim's
current statement that the assault occurred.
Id. at 217. The Battle court explained that the prosecution was allowed to present fresh complaint evidence
to corroborate the complainant’s testimony, and to rebut any inferences that the complainant’s testimony
was not credible. See id.
114
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3105 (West 2002). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that
prompt complaint is:
competent evidence, properly admitted when limited to establish that a complaint was
made . . . . Conversely, unexplained lack of evidence of hue and cry that one might
expect to ensue from rape casts doubt on the existence of the rape itself.
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d 1327, 1331-32 (Pa. 1982). Freeman contended that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of the victim’s prior complaints of the rape to third parties. See id. at 1331.
The court explained that, while the Pennsylvania Crimes Code no longer requires prompt complaint
evidence, it allows the evidence in as long as it is limited to the fact that a complaint was made. Id.
115
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. 1992), adopted a
somewhat unique variation on the fresh complaint doctrine: not only is the fact of a fresh complaint
admissible, the details of that complaint are also admissible. See id. at 675. Almost all other states
consider the details of the complaint inadmissible. See Aaron v. State, 139 So.2d 309, 316 (Ala. 1961);
Greenway v, State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1061 n.4 (Alaska 1980); Bing v. State, 740 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (Ark.
1987); People v. Burton, 359 P.2d 433, 444 (Cal. 1961); People v. Montague, 508 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo.
1973); Connecticut v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917, 928-29 (Conn. 1996); Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d
1295, 1305 (D.C. 1982); Custer v. State, 34 So.2d 100, 110 (Fla. 1947); Epps v. State, 118 S.E.2d 574, 578
(Ga. 1961); State v. Hall, 397 P.2d 261, 267 (Id. 1964); People v. Robinson, 383 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill.
1978); Woods v. State, 119 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ind. 1954); State v. Grady, 183 N.W.2d 707, 718 (Iowa
1971); Cook v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Ky. 1961); State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385, 1387
(Me. 1968); Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 888 (Miss. 1968); State v. Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708, 716 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Daniels, 388 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Neb. 1986); State v. Baca, 242 P.2d 1002, 1004
(N.M. 1952); People v. Stripling, 162 A.D.2d 1029 (N.Y. 1990); State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 699-700
(Or. 1985); Commonwealth v. Green, 409 A.2d 371, 374-75 (Pa. 1979); State v. Harrison, 113 S.E.2d 783,
784 (S.C. 1960); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545, 548 (S.D. 1971); Vera v. State, 709 S.W.2d 681, 685
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Moore v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 822, 826 (Va. 1981); State v. Ferguson, 667
P.2d 68, 72 (Wash. 1983); State v. Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198, 203 (W.Va. 1985)
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Like the traditional prompt complaint requirement, the corroboration requirement
has also been almost eradicated from formal rape law. Only three states—New York,
Ohio, and Texas—continue to impose a corroboration requirement in their criminal codes
for certain sexual offenses. New York requires corroboration of the complainant’s
testimony only when her lack of consent is due to her mental defect or incapacity.116
Ohio requires corroboration of the complainant’s testimony for the crime of “sexual
imposition,”117 but not for other sexual offenses.118 The Texas code states:
116

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (West 2002). The relevant statute provides that a person may not be
convicted, solely on the testimony of the victim, for a sexual offense of which lack of consent is an element
when that lack of consent “results solely from incapacity to consent because of the victim’s mental defect,
or mental incapacity.” Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (West 2002) (stating that lack of consent is an
element of every offense in Article 130, except for consensual sodomy). The offenses in Article 130
(sexual offenses) that require lack of consent as an element include the following: N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.20 (West 2002) (sexual misconduct); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (West 2002) (rape in third degree);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (West 2002) (rape in second degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (West 2002)
(rape in first degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.40 (West 2002) (sodomy in third degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.45 (West 2002) (sodomy in second degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.50 (West 2002) (sodomy in first
degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (West 2002) (sexual abuse in third degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.60
(West 2002) (sexual abuse in second degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65 (West 2002) (sexual abuse in
third degree). There are no corroboration requirements for testimony by victims in sexual offense cases in
which lack of consent does not result from mental incapacity or defect. People v. Soulia, 695 N.Y.S.2d
179, 182-83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (discussing corroboration requirements in cases in which lack of
consent results from mental incapacity and how that was not at issue in instant case); People v. Miller, 640
N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 1996) (holding that corroboration is not required to establish crime of
sexual abused when predicated upon allegation of forcible compulsion).
117
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(B) (West 2002). The required corroboration does not have to be
independently sufficient to convict the defendant and need not go to every element of the crime of sexual
imposition. See State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Oh. 1996). Rather, only slight circumstances are
required to support the victim’s testimony. Id. One court defined the required evidence to be “minimal.”
See City of Avon Lake v. Pinson, 695 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Ohio App. 1997). “Minimal evidence” was
defined as “slight circumstances or evidence which tends to support the victim’s testimony.” Id. Sexual
imposition is defined as:
No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause
another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause
two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:
(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person, or one of
the other persons, or is reckless in that regard.
(2) The offender knows that the other person’s, or one of the other person’s, ability to
appraise the the nature of or control the offender’s or touching person’s conduct is
substantially impaired.
(3) The offender knows that the other person, or one of the other persons, submits
because of being unaware of the sexual contact.
(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is thirteen years of age or older but less
than sixteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of such person, and
the offender is at least eighteen years of age and four or more years older than such other
person.
(5) The offender is a mental health professional, the other person or one of the other
persons is a mental health client or patient of the offender, and the offender induces the
other person who is the client or patient to submit by falsely representing to the other
person who is the client or patient that the sexual contact is necessary for mental health
treatment purposes.
118
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2002) (rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2002)
(sexual battery); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 2002) (gross sexual imposition).
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A conviction [for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault] is
supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual
offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the
alleged offense within one year after the date on which the offense is
alleged to have occurred.119
Texas thus allows corroboration and prompt complaint to offset one another in sexual
assault cases. In McBride v. State, for example, a Texas appellate court did not require
corroboration of the rape complainant’s testimony because she made a prompt outcry.120
In Friedel v. State, by contrast, a Texas appellate court reversed a rape conviction
because the complainant did not present corroborating evidence or promptly complain.121
Fourteen other state codes indicate that corroboration of a sexual offense
complainant’s testimony is not required.122 The remaining thirty-three states’ codes are
119

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.07(a) (West 2001). The one year reporting requirement does not
apply if the victim was, at the time of the offense, seventeen years of age or younger, sixty-five years of age
or older, or eighteen years of age or older but “by reason of age or physical or mental disease, defect, or
injury was substantially unable to satisfy the person’s need for food, shelter, medical care, or protection
from harm.” Id. § 38.07(b)(1)-(3).
Sexual assault is when “[a] person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally or
knowingly: (A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of another person by any means,
without that person’s consent; (B) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the sexual
organ of the actor, without that person’s consent; or (C) causes the sexual organ of another person, without
that person’s consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including
the actor….” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a).
Aggravated sexual assault is sexual assault when the person “(i) causes serious bodily injury or
attempts to cause the death of the victim or another person in the course of the same criminal episode; (ii)
by acts or words places the victim in fear that death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping will be
imminently inflicted on any person; (iii) by acts or words occurring in the presence of the victim threatens
to cause the death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping of any person; (iv) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon
in the course of the same criminal episode; (v) acts in concert with another who engages in conduct
described by Subdivision (1) directed toward the same victim and occurring during the course of the same
criminal episode; or (vi) administers or provides flunitrazepam, otherwise known as rohypnol, gamma
hydroxybutyrate, or ketamine to the victim of the offense with the intent of facilitating the commission of
the offense; . . .” Id. at § 22.021(2)(A).
120
1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 1284 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) at *17.
121
832 S.W.2d 420, 421-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
122
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 2002) amended by 2002 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 2002-211 (H.B.
1399) (West) (testimony of victim need not be corroborated in prosecution for sexual battery); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. CH. 720 §16-3-657 (West 2002) (testimony of victim need not be corroborated for criminal
sexual conduct); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(h) (West 2002) (testimony of victim need not be
corroborated in prosecutions for non-statutory sexual offenses); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (1) (West
2002) amended by 2002 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. CH. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (testimony of victim need
not be corroborated); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2028 (West 2002) (requiring no corroboration for testimony of
sexual assault victims); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (West 2002) (no requirement of corroboration for
victim’s testimony in prosecutions for sexual offenses under same chapter); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15
(West 2002) (indicating corroboration of victim’s testimony not required for § 30-9-11 Criminal Sexual
Penetration, § 30-9-12 Criminal Sexual Contact, § 30-9-13 Criminal Sexual Contact of a Minor, and § 309-14 Indecent Exposure); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West 2002) (testimony by complainants does
not need corroboration in prosecutions of sexual offenses); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-37-11 (West 2001)
(testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated in prosecutions for sexual assault); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-657 (West 2001) (no corroboration required for prosecution of criminal sexual conduct in first,
second, and third degrees, and criminal sexual conduct with a minor), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1
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silent on the issue of corroboration. However, case law from each of these states
indicates that corroboration of the complainant’s testimony is not ordinarily required.
Twenty-two states—Alabama,123 Arkansas,124 California,125 Colorado,126 Delaware,127
Georgia,128 Hawaii,129 Idaho,130 Illinois,131 Indiana,132 Iowa,133 Louisiana,134 Maine,135
Maryland,136 Nevada,137 New Jersey,138 North Carolina,139 North Dakota,140 Oregon,141
(West 2002) (testimony of complainant in sex offense case may not be treated differently than
complainant’s testimony in any other criminal case); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3255 (West 2002)
(corroborative evidence not required for rape); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (1) (West 2002) (no
requirement of corroboration of victim’s testimony for convictions of sex offenses); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 62-311 (West 2002) (no requirement of corroboration for sexual assault).
123
Myers v. State, 677 So.2d 807 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (“[I]t is well settled that a conviction for rape
may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”).
124
Freeman v. State, 959 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1998) (uncorroborated testimony of rape victim is sufficient to
sustain conviction of rape).
125
People v. Poggi, 753 P.2d 1082 (Cal. 1988) (conviction of sex crime may be sustained on
uncorroborated testimony of complainant).
126
People v. Fierro, 606 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1980) (corroboration of victim’s testimony is not essential in
criminal prosecution for unlawful sexual acts and that need for corroboration should be assessed by jury).
127
State v. Stewart, 1987 Del. Super. LEXIS 990 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (Delaware law does not require
corroborating evidence).
128
Hutchison v. State, 522 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (corroboration no longer necessary to establish
rape).
129
State v. Jones, 617 P.2d 1214 (Haw. 1980) (law does not require corroboration of complaining witness
in rape prosecution).
130
State v. Allen, 929 P.2d 118 (Idaho 1996) (Idaho does not require corroboration of testimony in rape
cases); State v. DeGrat, 913 P.2d 568 (Idaho 1996) (no longer requires corroboration in sexual crime trials).
131
People v. Carlson, 663 N.E.2d 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (in sex offense cases law does not require victim’s
testimony to be substantially corroborated to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
132
Browning v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (conviction for rape can rest solely on
uncorroborated testimony of victim).
133
State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1995) (law has abandoned notion that rape victim’s accusation
must be corroborated).
134
State v. Zornes, 774 So.2d 1062 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to establish
elements of offense).
135
In Maine, uncorroborated testimony will be scrutinized more carefully, however, corroboration is not
required. In State v. Palmer, 624 A.2d 469 (Me. 1993) (corroboration beyond testimony of prosecutrix is
not required to prove crime of rape); State v. Field, 170 A.2d 167 (Me. 1961) (in absence of corroboration
testimony must be scrutinized and analyzed with great care – if the testimony is contradictory,
unreasonable or incredible, it is not sufficient).
136
Moore v. State, 329 A.2d 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (victim’s testimony standing alone, if believed,
is sufficient to sustain conviction).
137
State v. Gomes, 930 P.2d 701 (Nev. 1996) (sexual assault victim’s uncorroborated testimony is
sufficient to convict).
138
State v. Garcia, 199 A.2d 860, 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964) (“It is clear that in our jurisdiction a
conviction for a morals or sex offense may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim”)
(citing State v. Fleckenstein, 159 A.2d 411, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)).
139
State v. Henderson, 2003 WL 138272 (N.C. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (“[T]he law does not required medical
evidence to corroborate a victim’s story as the victim’s word alone is sufficient evidence upon which a jury
can convict.”); State v. Rogers, 366 S.E.2d 474 (1988) (same).
140
State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 306 (N.D. 1984) (stating general rule and finding uncorroborated
testimony of victim had established all of elements of gross sexual imposition).
141
State v. Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426 (Or. App. 1970) (holding that rape conviction may be had on
uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix); State v. Morrow, 75 P.2d 737 (Or., 1938) (stating that, in
prosecution for rape corroboration is not required).

23

Tennessee,142 Utah,143 and Virginia144—allow a defendant to be convicted of rape based
on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. Twelve states and the District of
Columbia appear to qualify a general rule that no corroboration is required.145 For
example, in Alaska, when a complainant of sexual abuse later recants her allegation, the
state must produce corroborating evidence to support the original allegation.146 In
Arizona, corroboration may be needed when the witness’ story is physically impossible
or incredible.147 Oklahoma and West Virginia require corroboration only when the
complainant’s testimony is inherently improbable.148 In Kansas and Kentucky, the
complainant’s testimony need not be corroborated if it is clear and convincing and not
unbelievable.149 In Mississippi,150 Missouri,151 Montana,152 and the District of
142

Montgomery v. State, 556 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (“The rape statute . . . does not
require that the testimony of the violated female be corroborated.”).
143
State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1987) (declining to adopt position that testimony of rape
victim alone cannot support a conviction).
144
Moore v. Com., 491 S.E.2d 739 (Va. 1997) (stating that conviction of rape may be sustained solely upon
victim’s testimony).
145
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Oklahoma, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See citations in next notes.
146
See Henry v. State, 861 P.2d 582 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (when victim of sexual abuse recants
allegation, state must show corroborating evidence to support prior allegations); Brower v. State, 728 P.2d
645 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (conviction can only be based on complaining witness’ prior inconsistent
statements only if corroborating evidence existed).
In Massachusetts, corroborative evidence is required to support a prior inconsistent statement. See
Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 740 N.E.2d 602 (Mass. 2000) (corroborative evidence required when there is
“prior inconsistent Grand Jury testimony that contains an essential element of the crime”).
147
State v. Williams, 526 P.2d 714 (Ariz. 1974) (conviction may be had on basis of uncorroborated
testimony of prosecutrix unless story is physically impossible or so incredible that no reasonable person
could believe it).
148
Remine v. State, 759 P.2d 230, 232 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (corroboration of the victim’s testimony is
“only necessary when [the] prosecutrix’s testimony is too inherently improbable to support a conviction”).
State v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 337 (W. Va. 1988) (allowing sex offense convictions to rest
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, unless the testimony is “inherently incredible”). West
Virginia also allows the court to give a cautionary instruction when testimony is uncorroborated. See State
v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 337 (W. Va. 1988).
149
State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261 (Kan. 1994) (testimony of prosecutrix alone could be sufficient to
sustain rape conviction without further corroboration as long as it is clear and convincing); State v.
Mitchell, 771 P.2d 73 (Kan. 1989) (when uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix is unbelievable,
testimony alone is insufficient to sustain rape conviction); State v. Matlock, 660 P.2d 945 (Kan. 1983)
(conviction of rape can be upheld without corroboration as long as there is clear and convincing evidence
and as long as testimony is not so incredible and improbable as to defy belief); Carrier v. Commonwealth,
356 S.W.2d 752 (Ken. 1962) (stating that uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix may be sufficient to
sustain conviction if proof is clear and convincing, but insufficient if prosecutrix’s story is intrinsically
improbable or her actions before and after alleged offense indicate that offense did not happen).
150
Williams v. State, 757 So.2d 953 (Miss. 1999) (stating that unsupported word of victim of sex crime is
sufficient to support a guilty verdict where that testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other
credible evidence).
151
State v. Gilyard, 979 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1998) (corroborative evidence can be highly probative of victim
credibility and may even be essential, such as where victim’s testimony is unconvincing or contradictory).
152
State v. Olson, 951 P.2d 571, 576-77 (Mont. 1997) (reversing previous case law insofar as cases
required victim’s testimony be consistent with other evidence to support a conviction of sexual assault);
(State v. Howie, 744 P.2d 156, 159 (Mont. 1987) (“Conviction of a sexual assault may be based entirely on
the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”).
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Columbia,153 corroboration is not required except to explain inconsistencies within the
complainant’s testimony. Wisconsin requires corroboration when the complainant’s
testimony is unreliable.154
Like the prompt complaint requirement and the corroboration requirement,
cautionary instructions have also greatly waned in formal rape law.155 Cautionary
instructions for rape are prohibited in more than half of the states. Codes in seven states
prohibit the judge from issuing jury instructions that the complainant’s testimony should
be reviewed with special caution given the nature of sexual crimes.156 In addition, a
153

Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211 (D.C. 1993) (recognizing that corroboration requirement has been
abolished but that corroboration might still be necessary, not to ascertain truth of statement but to explain
inconsistencies).
154
See Thomas v. State, 284 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Wis. 1979) (stating victim’s testimony was unreliable
because she “stated that she did not remember the incident of sexual intercourse and only testified as to
what she had been told to say”). (“[T]his court has held that ‘. . . [w]here the testimony of the prosecuting
witness bears upon its face evidence of its unreliability, to sustain a conviction there should be
corroboration by other evidence as to the principal facts relied on to constitute the crime.’”).
155
Cautionary instructions are regularly employed for the testimony of accomplices, individuals who are or
could have been indicted for the same crime as the defendant, arising out of the same events, who testify
against the defendant in return for immunity or a lesser charge against them. Christine J. Saverda, Note,
Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 786
(1990). Unlike rape victims, accomplices as a routine matter may have self-interested motives for lying or
exaggerating on the witness stand. In Hawaii, the cautionary instruction for accomplice testimony reads:
The testimony of an alleged accomplice should be examined and weighed by you with
greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses. You should decide
whether the witness’s testimony has been affected by the witness’s interest in the
outcome of the case, or by prejudice against the defendant, or by the benefits that the
witness stands to receive because of his/her testimony, or by the witness’s fear of
retaliation from the government.
Hawaii Criminal Jury Instructions 6.01(A). In Oklahoma, the accomplice cautionary instruction
states: “No person may be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice unless the testimony of
such a witness is corroborated by other evidence.” Vernon’s Okla. Forms 2d, OUJI-CR 9-25. See
also Colo. Jury Instr.. Criminal 4:06, CO-JICRIM 4:06; 10 Minn. Prac. Jury Instr. Guides –
Criminal CRIMJIG 3.18 (4th ed.).
Cautionary instructions have sometimes been issued with child and alibi witnesses. See, e.g.,
Carol J. Miller, Annotation, Instructions to Jury as to Credibility of Child’s Testimony in Criminal Case, 32
A.L.R.4th 1196 (2003); Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Instructions on
Credibility of Alibi Witnesses, 72 A.L.R.3d 617 (2003).
156
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-408 (West 2002) (“In any criminal prosecution [for a sexual offense], or
for attempt or conspiracy to commit any [sexual offense crime], the jury shall not be instructed to examine
with caution the testimony of the victim solely because of the nature of the charge, nor shall the jury be
instructed that such a charge is easy to make but difficult to defend against, nor shall any similar instruction
be given.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.6 West 2002 (stating that no instruction is permitted that tells jury to
use different standard for victim’s testimony than that of another witness to that offense or another
offense); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-320 (West 2002) (prohibiting jury instruction telling jury to examine
victim’s testimony with caution solely because of nature of charge); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (5)(d)
(West 2002) amended by 2002 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. CH. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (prohibiting
instruction for jury to scrutinize victim’s testimony more closely than in other prosecutions); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 175.186(2) (Michie 2002) (prohibiting instruction that states that rape is difficult to prove or
establish beyond a reasonable doubt); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West) (“The credibility of a
complainant of an offense under this chapter shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility
of a complainant of any other crime. The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in
prosecutions [for sexual offenses]. No instructions shall be given cautioning the jury to view the
complainant’s testimony in any other way than that in which all complainants’ testimony is viewed.”); S.D.
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Florida statute generally prohibits judges from commenting to the jury on the credibility
of witnesses, which has been applied in rape cases to reject cautionary instructions.157
Cautionary instructions in rape cases have also been prohibited by case law in the District
of Columbia158 and twenty other states—Alaska,159 Arizona,160 California,161 Florida,162
Georgia,163 Idaho,164 Indiana,165 Iowa,166 Louisiana,167 Missouri,168 Montana,169
Nevada,170 North Dakota,171 Ohio,172 Oregon,173 Rhode Island,174 Utah,175 Virginia,176
Washington,177 and Wyoming.178
The remaining thirteen states do not always require cautionary instructions but
have not prohibited them.179 For example, Nebraska courts have ruled that it was not
error to refuse to issue the traditional cautionary instruction when an instruction
emphasizing “the grave importance of its fact-finding function in the administration of
justice” was given.180 Texas has not prohibited cautionary instructions, but there is no
rule requiring them.181 The courts of Arkansas,182 Connecticut183 and Mississippi184
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1 (Michie) (“The testimony of the complaining witness in a trial for a charge
of rape shall not, merely because of the nature of that charge, be treated in any different manner than the
testimony of a complaining witness in any other criminal case.”).
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See State v. Selman, 300 So.2d 467, 470 (La. 1974).
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In State v. Vicars, rather than instructing specifically for rape, the jury instruction stated: “Consider the
importance of your function as jurors. You are the sole judges of the facts. Your decision on these facts is
final. Thus, your position is of grave importance in the proper functioning of the court in the
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retain the discretion to use cautionary instructions in rape cases. In eight other states—
Delaware,185 Hawaii,186 Kansas,187 Maine,188 New Hampshire,189 New Mexico,190 West
Virginia,191 and Wisconsin192—although corroboration is not required, some courts have
issued cautionary jury instructions in rape cases.
The formal prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and
cautionary instructions in the criminal law of rape have been rejected in most
jurisdictions. There are good reasons that states have repudiated these doctrines, for each
is based on faulty assumptions.
II.

The Faulty Assumptions Behind the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions

One obvious problem with the prompt complaint requirement, corroboration
requirement, and cautionary instructions in rape law is that they will not thwart a shrewd
manipulator. Take Potiphar’s wife, for example. She made a point of promptly
complaining. After Joseph rejected her sexual advances, she immediately called the men
of her house together and claimed, “See, he came in unto me to lie with me, and I cried
with a loud voice.”193 Potiphar’s wife gathered corroborative evidence for her false
claim. She produced the garment Joseph shed to flee her clutches and capitalized on that
182
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evidence, claiming to the assembled crowd, “And when he heard that I lifted up my voice
and cried, he left his garment with me, and fled.”194 Finally, even if someone had
cautioned Potiphar of the risk of a wrongful conviction, he would probably have thrown
Joseph in prison anyway.
Independent of their ineffectiveness at stopping false rape complaints, the prompt
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions are based
on a series of false assumptions. The prompt complaint rule assumes that, if a woman
were really raped, she would promptly complain to authorities, and that the failure to
promptly complain to authorities means that she was not really raped.195 As Wigmore
surmised:
It was entirely natural, after becoming a victim of assault against her will,
that she should have spoken out. That she did not, that she went about as
if nothing had happened, was in effect an assertion that nothing violent
had been done.196
The reality of victims’ experiences, however, is quite different. Most rape victims
do not promptly report the crimes they suffer to police or other authorities. In fact, most
do not ever report. According to the 1992-2000 Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National
Crime Victimization Survey, 63 percent of rapes, 65 percent of attempted rapes, and 74
percent of sexual assaults were not reported to the police.197 A 1997 Bureau of Justice
Statistics random sample survey of 4,446 college-aged women found that, although about
one in ten had been raped and another one in ten had experienced an attempted rape,
fewer than five percent reported their rapes or attempted rapes to police or other campus
authorities.198 Of those rape victims who do tell police or other authorities of having
194
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been sexually attacked, a substantial percentage delays reporting for a period of time.199
Most women who are raped, therefore, do not promptly complain.
The corroboration requirement assumes that, if a woman were really raped, she
would have corroborative evidence of the assault, and that her failure to produce
corroboration means that she was not really raped. Again, the reality of rape victims’
experiences is quite different. Corroboration in a rape case usually refers to physical
injuries from the assault, torn clothing, or other evidence of a physical struggle.200
Contrary to popular belief, however, non-genital, physical injury from rape is
uncommon.201 The Department of Justice studied victims admitted to hospital emergency
rooms for rape, a population that one would assume suffers from more serious and
numerous physical injuries than victims not admitted to emergency rooms post-rape.
Sixty-eight percent of these admitted emergency room rape victims suffered no nongenital physical injuries, just 26 percent suffered mild non-genital physical injuries, only
5 percent suffered moderate non-genital physical injuries, and just .02 percent suffered
severe non-genital physical injuries.202 Even genital physical injuries are rare. Most rape
victims do not suffer the kind of genital trauma that is detectable by hospital staff.203
The other type of corroborative evidence frequently thought valid is torn clothes
or other evidence of a serious physical battle between the assailant and the victim. The
reality, however, is that most rapes do not involve a fight that would produce this kind of
evidence.204 Most rapists, particularly acquaintance rapists, are able to subdue their
victims with verbal coercion and pinning and need not resort to overt physical
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violence.205 Additionally, some women become frozen with fear once an attack begins,
which prevents them from physically resisting their assailants.206
Cautionary instructions for juries in rape cases assume that jurors are ordinarily
biased in favor of an alleged rape victim and so should be cautioned against this natural
inclination. As Hale explained, in rape cases, “the heinousness of the offense many
times” transports the judge and jury to hastily convict.207 Given our country’s racial
history after the Civil War in which whites used rape allegations to terrorize the black
community and inspire lynchings, Hale’s admonition may be relevant to black on white
stranger rapes today.208 In those relatively rare circumstances, it is quite possible that the
judge and jury may be transported to hastily convict. In most rape cases—which are
intra-racial and committed by acquaintances—however, social science literature
documents quite the opposite. Studies indicate that jurors go out of their way to
scrutinize the victim’s behavior and use it to excuse the defendant’s behavior. The
cautionary instructions both derive from and exacerbate this expansive societal prejudice
against rape victims.
It has become a cliché to say that the legal proceedings in a rape case (and the
media circus that occasionally accompanies them) put the victim on trial.209 However,
this notion is more real than rhetorical. Juries are hyper-critical of a victim’s behavior
and tend to blame her for the rape itself.210 Studies indicate that the outcome of an
205
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average rape trial has more to do with the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s guilt
than it has to do with its assessment of the defendant’s guilt.211
A complainant’s perceived promiscuity,212 less-than-chaste clothing style,213 and
failure to conform to gender norms negatively affect jurors’ assessment of whether a rape
has occurred.214 Any victim behavior that increases the risk for sexual assault (from
hitchhiking to dating to just talking to a man at a party) leads to leniency with the
defendant.215 As one study concluded:
Any evidence of [the victim’s] drinking, drug use, or sexual activity
outside of marriage led jurors to doubt defendants’ guilt, as did any prior
acquaintance between victim and defendant. In fact . . . measures of
victims’ gender-role behavior were more important than measures of
physical evidence and seriousness of offense in predicting jurors’ case
evaluations.216
Jurors thus often blur the distinction between a complainant’s behavior that may increase
her risk of being raped with a justification for the rape itself.217 In rape cases, juries
frequently make a victim’s negligence tantamount to her consent to the sex alleged to
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have been rape.218 Jurors can thereby nullify rape law “by importing the tort concept of
contributory negligence or assumption of risk into the criminal case, acquitting the
defendant when they believe that the victim behaved carelessly.”219 Although neither a
rape victim’s “contributory negligence” nor her “assumption of the risk” is a defense in
rape law, jurors employ these doctrines to excuse the defendant’s conduct.220
Cautionary instructions that warn juries to “to evaluate the testimony of a victim
or complaining witness with special care in view of” her “emotional involvement” in the
crime221 do not mitigate societal bias in favor of rape complainants. Instead, such
cautionary instructions aggravate substantial societal bias against rape complainants.
They are both an expression of and an exacerbating factor in that widespread bias.
The modern incarnation of the erroneous notion that women and girls are prone to
lie about sexual assault derives at least in part from the misogyny Sigmund Freud brought
to the burgeoning field of psychoanalysis he founded in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Freud asserted that women unconsciously desire sexual assault because they
are inherently masochistic.222 Courts and legal scholars used the assertions of Freud and
his contemporaries to support their view that women are apt to fabricate accusations of
rape.223 Wigmore argued:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young
girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their
psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects,
partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad
social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional
conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false
charges of sexual offences by men. The unchaste (let us call it) mentality
finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sexincidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface
the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however,
218
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too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy
naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy
credit to such a plausible tale.224
The fields of psychology and psychiatry have since rejected Wigmore and Freud’s
argument that the female psyche is inherently defective.225
To be sure, there are personality disorders that might lead a man or woman to lie
in any number of outrageous ways, including lodging a false report of a crime.226 There
is, however, no specific empirical research connecting any of these personality disorders
with false complaints of rape to the police. In fact, there is no good empirical data on
false rape complaints either historically or currently. A debate over the number of false
complaints nevertheless continues.
One side of the debate maintains that only two percent of rape complaints made to
the police are false.227 In her popular 1975 book on rape, Against Our Will, Susan
Brownmiller wrote, “When New York City instituted a special sex crimes analysis squad
and put police women (instead of men) in charge of interviewing complaints, the number
of false charges in New York dropped dramatically to 2 percent, a figure that corresponds
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exactly to the rate of false reports for other violent crimes.”228 Over time and perhaps
through repetition,229 this two percent false rate has come to constitute the “conventional
scholarly wisdom” on the matter.230 The United States Justice Department appears to
side with this camp, stating, “False accusations of sexual assault are estimated to occur at
the low rate of two percent—similar to the rate of false accusations for other crimes.”231
The other side of the debate claims that eight percent or more of rape complaints
made to the police are false, a percentage disproportionate to other crimes.232 The FBI
Uniform Crime Reports have in the past indicated that, overall, about eight percent of
forcible rape complaints reported to police are “unfounded;”233 however, “unfounded”
does not mean false.234 Police may code a case “unfounded” when they conclude that it
is unverifiable, not serious, or not prosecutable.235 Various factors can increase a city’s
percentage of “unfounded” rape complaints, such as police incompetence, bias, or
insensitivity to rape victims.236 The Department of Justice reports:
Some police officers incorrectly think that a rape report is unfounded or
false if any of the following conditions apply:
—the victim has a prior relationship with the offender
(including having previously been intimate with him);
—the victim used alcohol or drugs at the time of the
assault;
228
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—there is no visible evidence of injury;
—the victim delays disclosure to the police and/or others
and does not undergo a rape medical exam; and/or
—the victim fails to immediately label her assault as rape
and/or blames herself.237
Neither side’s numbers in the debate over false complaints of rape lodged with the police
appear, therefore, to be supported by the kind of empirical evidence upon which one
might feel confident.238. As a scientific matter, the frequency of false rape complaints to
police or other legal authorities remains unknown.
While there is very little empirical evidence on false rape complaints to the police,
there are ample data indicating that real rapes remain vastly underreported to the
police.239 Rape is, in fact, one of the most underreported serious crimes.240 Although
decades of studies document the great reluctance of true rape victims to report their
attacks to the police, many continue to fixate on the risk of false rape complainants, a risk
that does not enjoy empirical support.
Most rape victims not only do not promptly complain, they do not ever complain
to police or other legal authorities of having been sexually victimized. Corroborative
evidence of sexual assault—such as torn clothes or injuries—is not only uncommon, it is
downright rare. Instead of exhibiting a bias in favor of rape victims that jurors need to be
cautioned against, jurors tend to be biased against rape victims and traditional cautionary
instructions in rape cases only exacerbate that bias. Instead of warding off false claims,
then, these three legal doctrines greatly hinder the prosecution of truthful claims.
Because they are based on faulty assumptions, the criminal rape law in most jurisdictions
has formally rejected the prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and
cautionary instructions.241
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III.

Campus Sexual Assault Policies and Practices

In the early 19th century, the newly created American institutions of higher
education were rampant with student disorder.242 In general, colleges and universities
policed crime on campus institutionally rather than referring students to the outside
criminal justice system.243 After a student riot at Harvard in 1818, for example, John
Adams suggested flogging to discipline the unruly undergraduates.244 Disavowing
corporal punishment, Thomas Jefferson established a student government at the
University of Virginia in the hopes that its undergraduates would thereby control
themselves.245 Less than a year later, however, campus disorder had only escalated and
the faculty threatened to resign.246 After a violent altercation involving fourteen students
and two professors at the University of Virginia, Jefferson dissolved the student
government and constructed a new disciplinary code.247
Student discipline in the early republic involved only male student behavior
because women were forbidden from attending college.248 Despite Oberlin’s first foray
into coeducation at its founding in 1833, women remained but a small minority of the
collegiate student body through most of the century.249 By the beginning of the 20th
century, however, (and despite the resistance of many prestigious institutions, particularly
in the Northeast and South) coeducation became the predominant form of higher
education in America.250 The issue of sexual assault on campus, however, did not arise
until much later in 20th century.
During the past few decades, many factors led colleges and universities to change
their disciplinary codes to address student sexual assault.251 In the 1960s, attitudes
toward college students changed when states lowered the age of majority and the 26th
CODE § 213.6(6), 425 (A.L.I. 1980) (“New York’s corroboration requirement was amended substantially in
1972 and revised completely in 1974” because “it was thought to reflect an official policy of suspicion
towards female complainants and an overzealous attitude toward protecting male defendants”) (footnotes
omitted).
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Amendment reduced the voting age to 18.252 The sexual revolution of the 1960s and
1970s meant that young adults were more likely to engage in sexual interactions.253
Student curfews were repealed and mixed-sex dorms opened.254 In the 1970s, criminal
reform of rape law became a central item on the feminist agenda.255 In the 1980s, Dr.
Mary Koss published a nationwide survey of 6,100 college students on rape, and her
research sparked widespread interest in campus sexual assault.256 In the 1990s, media
then became interested in colleges’ disciplinary responses to sexual assault on campus.257
As a result of these changes, colleges and universities have implemented a variety of
sexual assault codes. Penalties for violations of these codes can include fines,
reprimands, negative notations on one’s record, probation, suspension, or expulsion.258
There are a number of reasons a woman raped on campus might choose to avail
herself of these codes and pursue a campus disciplinary proceeding instead of a criminal
proceeding against her attacker. Victims often harbor substantial fear of the publicity and
emotional trauma attendant to a trial process.259 If a rape victim can obtain some
recourse at a more local level, she often feels more comfortable pursuing it.260 A victim
may also simply want to have her attacker suspended or expelled so she does not have to
face him in calculus class, for instance. Finally and most importantly, the criminal justice
system, with its standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rarely provides
relief to acquaintance rape victims, so a campus disciplinary proceeding may appear to be
a more advantageous avenue of potential relief.261 The legacy of the prompt complaint
requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions as they now affect
campus sexual assault policies and practices are making disciplinary proceedings less
advantageous, however.
A. Emergence of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions in Campus Sexual Assault
Policies and Practices
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In response to the growing concern over sexual assault and rape on campus, a
disturbing development has emerged at some colleges and universities. Some institutions
of higher learning are imposing versions of the ancient corroboration and prompt
complaint requirements on victims through informal practice and even through formal
policies laid out in campus disciplinary procedures. These antiquated tactics, rejected by
the vast majority of criminal law jurisdictions in the United States decades ago, tend to
deter sexual assault victims from coming forward and, in those cases that do come to
light, to resolve them hastily in favor of the accused.
In 1993, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard College, the undergraduate
division of Harvard University, adopted a strong statement against sexual misconduct.262
The 1993 statement granted students “the right to bodily safety and integrity” and
affirmed that the institution was “committed to creating and maintaining an environment”
in which all individuals “are treated with dignity and feel safe and secure in their
persons.”263 It said:
In accordance with these principles, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences will
not tolerate sexual misconduct including rape and sexual assault, whether
affecting a man or a woman, perpetrated by an acquaintance or a stranger,
by someone of the same sex or someone of the opposite sex. Such
behavior is unacceptable in our community. A student who commits rape,
sexual assault, or other sexual misconduct is subject to severe penalties
under the rules of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Rape and sexual
assault are serious crimes under the laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and the individuals responsible for such acts are subject to
prosecution and legal penalties.
The statement indicated that a victim could “initiate disciplinary or remedial action for
sexual misconduct, including rape and sexual assault, through Harvard College in
accordance with the procedures for adjudicating peer disputes.”264 A victim could pursue
such a disciplinary action at the campus level whether or not she chose to report to the
local police and pursue the case criminally.265 The 1993 statement was a strong policy in
favor of victims’ rights.
Nine years later, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard College adopted a
new set of procedures for complaints of sexual assault.266 Newspaper reports indicated
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that a “spike in accusations” of student rape motivated the changes.267 Harvard officials
indicated that the school disciplinary system failed to reach satisfactory results in these
recent cases.268 When he recommended the new procedures, Harry Lewis, the Dean of
Harvard College, said that the Administrative Board at Harvard, the body responsible for
resolving peer disputes, was not equipped to deal with what he characterized as “he
said/she said” rape complaints.269
The previous academic year was representative of Harvard’s inadequacy in
disciplining campus rape. During the 2000-01 academic term the Administrative Board
handled seven student complaints of sexual assault.270 In six of the seven cases, the
Board chose to take no disciplinary action against the accused. In the one case in which
the Board did take disciplinary action, the Board found the complainant and the accused
equally responsible for the assault and required them both to withdraw from the
college.271
In one of the six cases in which the Board chose to take no disciplinary action, a
sophomore complained of having been raped in the fall of her first year at Harvard by a
male student.272 According to the complainant, he sexually assaulted her twice as she
lapsed in and out of consciousness due to heavy intoxication. The complainant submitted
a list of fifteen witnesses to the Administrative Board. The Board concluded there was
not enough evidence to resolve the case in the complainant’s favor and so took no
disciplinary action against the accused.273
Harvard administrators believed that, despite the complainant’s fifteen witnesses,
this case was emblematic of the so-called “he said/she said” rape complaints that the
Board did not have the capacity to resolve.274 Harvard administrators did not indicate a
problem with the disciplinary board itself. They asserted, instead, that the problem was
with female students who, they alleged, had “unrealistic expectations” in bringing their
complaints of having been sexual assaulted to the Administration Board.275
The 2002 Procedures were a way to eliminate those complaints from the Board’s
docket. The Procedures said:
procedural change does not alter the College’s policies regarding rape, sexual assault, or
other sexual misconduct as voted by the Faculty in 1993.
See New Procedure for Peer Disputes: Administrative Board of Harvard College, 2002-2003, available at
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Complaints must ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely manner.
The Board typically cannot resolve peer dispute cases in which there is
little evidence except the conflicting statements of the principals.
Therefore, the Board ordinarily will not consider a case unless the
allegations presented by the complaining party are supported by
independent corroborating evidence. Based on the information provided
at the time of the complaint, the Board will decide whether or not there
appears to be sufficient corroborating evidence to pursue the complaint.276
These new procedures not only implemented an explicit prompt complaint requirement
and a corroboration requirement under ordinary circumstances, they also implied a
cautionary rule. Complaints needed to be “timely,” allegations needed to be supported by
“sufficient corroborating evidence,” and Harvard cautioned the Board against pursuing
cases in which the victim had “little evidence” but her own testimony.277
A preliminary investigation would “assess whether the complaint has the potential
to be resolved through the College’s judicial process.”278 If the Board was “unlikely to
obtain information beyond students’ conflicting and credible accounts,” the Board might
“decline to pursue a complaint further.”279 Harvard thereby cautioned officials against
pursuing grievances in which the complainant’s “credible account” of her sexual abuse
was the only evidence she had.
A student grievance would proceed as follows. First, the complainant would give
“the College a detailed written statement summarizing his or her complaint along with a
descriptive list of all sources of information (persons, correspondence, records, actions
taken, etc.) that may help to corroborate the allegations.”280 The sources of information
could include “virtually anything that helps to corroborate a student’s account, including,
for example, diary entries or conversations with roommates or friends; it is not limited to
eyewitnesses, confessions, or forensic evidence.”281 The accused was then asked to
“prepare a detailed written statement along with a descriptive list of sources of supporting
information.”282
The Secretary of the Administrative Board would review “the statements and lists
of supporting information and collect any other statements or documents that help to
corroborate the students’ accounts.”283 The Secretary would then present the information
to the Chair of the Board. The Chair took one of two actions. If “responsibility for the
alleged misconduct can likely be established or corroborated,” the Chair might refer the
276
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matter to a subcommittee of the Board for a full investigation.284 If, however, “the
essential facts of an allegation are contested” or if “responsibility for the alleged conduct
cannot be clearly established from the statements or other preliminary documents, the
Chair will refer the matter to the full Administrative Board.”285 The Board would then
choose to “refer the matter to a subcommittee for further investigation, bracket or
postpone a decision on the matter pending receipt of additional specific information, or
decline to pursue the complaint further and instead refer to students to other avenues of
possible resolution.”286 A complainant’s ability to meet the ancient corroboration and
prompt complaint requirements would determine which outcome she obtained.
Ironically, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has never imposed a prompt
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, or cautionary instructions in its rules
for the criminal prosecution of sexual offenses.287 As a result, in theory at least, it is
harder to be disciplined at Harvard College for having raped a student under the 2002
Procedures than it is to be convicted in the Commonwealth and incarcerated in a
Massachusetts prison for the same act.
In June 2002, an anonymous Harvard student filed a complaint with the Office of
Civil Rights (“OCR”) at the Department of Justice. The student claimed that Harvard’s
2002 Procedures violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 because they
did not provide students “access to a prompt and equitable resolution of complaints.”288
The complaint alleged that, because the 2002 Procedures required sexual assault victims
to provide “sufficient independent corroboration” before a formal investigation into the
complaint would be launched, the policy discriminated against the (mostly female)
victims of sexual assault on campus.289
OCR investigated the complaint and concluded that there was no Title IX
violation.290 It determined that Harvard’s 2002 Procedures, including the “sufficient
independent corroboration” requirement and the preliminary investigation stage, did not
deny sexual assault victims a “prompt and equitable process” for resolving their
complaints.291 OCR concluded, “Title IX does not prohibit a process that limits the
284
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proceedings if it appears from a reasonable preliminary inquiry that further investigation
would not produce evidence that could resolve the complaint.”292
In 2003, the Harvard faculty revised some of the language in the 2002 Procedures.
The relevant passage now states:
Complaints must ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely manner.
The Board typically cannot resolve peer dispute cases in which there is
little evidence except the conflicting statements of the principals.
Therefore, students are asked to provide as much information as possible
to support their allegations. Based on that information and any other
information obtained through investigation, the Board will decide whether
to issue a charge.293
This revision failed to alter the prompt complaint requirement. Harvard’s insistence that
the Board “cannot resolve peer disputes in which there is little evidence except the
conflicting statements of the principals” remains the same. Instead of being told that the
Board will “not consider a case unless the allegations … are supported by independent
corroborating evidence,” complainants are “asked to provide as much information as
possible to support their allegations.” Based on the information provided, the Board will
decide whether to issue a charge and continue with investigation. Although the troubling
word “corroborating” has been erased from the policy, the revision is one of form and not
substance. Robert Mitchell, director of communications for the Faculty of Arts and
Sciences at Harvard, stated that nothing in the revision changed the way Harvard handles
sexual assaults and the revision of the policy is “purely for clarification.”294 The Dean of
Harvard College agreed, indicating that the revision to the 2002 Procedures is “not
substantial.”295
Robert Iuliano, Harvard’s deputy general counsel, now suggests that victims of
acquaintance rape turn to the Massachusetts criminal justice system for relief since the
Harvard Administrative Board can no longer help them. He asserts, “The courts, or at
least the police, are in a better position to conduct an investigation. They have access to
investigative tools that we don’t have.”296 Dean Harry Lewis concurs, “I want to
encourage women to take cases to the criminal justice system where something can be
done. We don’t have forensic laboratories, we don’t have subpoenas.”297 There is no
evidence, however, that the trouble with rape cases at Harvard was that the Board lacked
subpoena power or a place to conduct DNA analysis. In campus acquaintance rape cases
in which the defense is almost always consent neither investigative tool is often used.298
challenged in the OCR Ruling were those that were to be followed by a student bringing a complaint
against another student. See id. “Title IX does not prohibit the use of due process. Nor does it set specific
standards of how much process is required.”
292
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293
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Iuliano and Lewis are no doubt aware that the criminal justice system, with its standard of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rarely provides relief to acquaintance rape
victims.299
Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel for the American Council on Education, an
umbrella organization of 1,800 colleges, nevertheless heralded Harvard College’s new
sexual assault procedures as “creative, innovative, and an attempt to try and insert a
degree of fairness in a process that is, because of the nature of the allegations of sexual
assault, unduly complicated.”300 Harvey Silverglate, an attorney who has represented a
number of students accused of rape, agrees: “The new policy is one of the best things to
happen to the campus judicial system in years.”301 Because the OCR at the Department
of Justice has now given Harvard College the green light in its sexual assault policy,
other schools may imitate the institution. Mr. Steinbach predicts: “When a prominent
institution tries something innovative, other institutions are likely to follow.”302
To analyze the sexual assault policies at the other top colleges and universities in
the country, I attempted to contact what U.S. News & World Report listed in its 2003
survey as the top 50 national universities303 and the top 50 liberal arts colleges.304 I
received hard copies of sexual assault policies from 31 institutions305 and obtained sexual
assault policies from 33 other institutions’ websites.306 In total, I reviewed 64 campus
sexual assault policies.307
Like Harvard’s 1993 Policy, the majority of these institutions have sexual assault
policies that are victim-friendly in some respects. A number of policies list the
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complainant’s rights,308 emphasize the institution’s commitment to confidentiality,309
instruct students about what to do if they are sexually assaulted,310 state that pursuing
disciplinary procedures is up to the complainant,311 give examples of what is and is not
considered sexual assault,312 or provide other consoling and helpful suggestions.313
In terms of prompt complaint, campus policies routinely urge victims to report
having been sexually assaulted as soon as possible. For example, Amherst College’s
policy states:
You are encouraged to report immediately any incidents of this nature . . .
even if you do not wish to pursue the matter further. Keep in mind that an
assailant who is allowed to go unpursued is a potential future danger, not
only to you but also to other members of the community.314
The Georgia Institute of Technology states simply, “Time is of the essence when a sexual
assault has occurred. The sooner an assault is reported, the easier it is to collect valuable
evidence.”315
308
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In a number of campus policies, it appears that the failure to promptly complain
may be held against the alleged victim. For example, one policy declares, “Any student
of Occidental College who feels that he or she has been the subject of sexual assault or
any person witnessing sexual assault should promptly report the incident.”316 Pepperdine
University’s policy urges, “Victims understandably find rape and sexual assault upsetting
and painful to discuss. However, it is important to report the incident as soon as
possible.”317 Washington and Lee University states, “Because it is often difficult to
determine the facts of an incident long after it occurred, complaints should be filed as
soon as possible.”318
By contrast, a number of schools make explicit that, although students are urged
to promptly report, there is no prompt complaint requirement. For example, the
California Institute of Technology’s policy states: “Students who wish to file a complaint
against another student should do so as soon as possible after the assault, although
complaints may be filed at any time.”319 Many institutions make clear that there is no
time limit for complaints of sexual assault when both the complainant and the accused are
students. Wake Forest, for example, notes, “While students are encouraged to report any
sexual assault as soon as possible, they may initiate University judicial proceedings at
any time while the individuals involved are students at the University.”320
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A minority of campus policies limits the time period within which a sexual assault
must be reported. Columbia University, for example, requires an incident to be reported
within five years.321 Duke University requires a report within two years.322
Northwestern University requires a report within one year.323 Stanford University grants
accused students the right: “To have charges filed no more than six months after the
alleged misconduct occurred or should reasonably have been discovered.”324 Wesleyan
University states, “Reports should be submitted as soon as possible, but preferably within
five (5) days of the incident.”325 In terms of a prompt complaint requirement, then,
college and university sexual assault policies are widely diverse. Many strongly
encourage rape victims to promptly complain, a few suggest that the failure to do so will
be held against the complainant, and a few maintain a prompt complaint rule as statutes
of limitations.
By contrast, none of the campus sexual assault policies reviewed besides
Harvard’s contains language about a corroboration requirement or cautionary
instructions. This silence is not surprising given that very few policies even articulate
what the standard of proof is for the finding of a disciplinary infraction. A recent
National Institute of Justice survey of the sexual assault policies of 2,438 institutions of
higher learning found that just one in five articulated a standard of proof.326 The standard
of proof is explicit in only 22 out of the 64 policies from the top institutions I reviewed.
The National Institute of Justice found that, in those policies in which it was
explicit, eight of ten used “preponderance of the evidence.” Among top universities and
colleges I reviewed, a majority also used a “preponderance of the evidence” or “more
321
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likely than not” standard.327 Five required clear and convincing evidence.328 A few
developed their own standards. Northwestern University required “sufficient
evidence,”329 Whitman College required “highly probable” evidence,330 and Washington
and Lee University indicated that the finding of a disciplinary infraction “must be
supported by reasonable evidence.”331 The broad range of standards of proof for
disciplinary infractions indicates that there is no uniformly accepted method for
evaluating these claims. The problem with silence on the standard of proof is that the
age-old theories of rape regarding corroboration and caution that have largely been
discredited in criminal law may unduly influence disciplinary tribunals’ perceptions of
what is required for a finding of sexual assault.
Independent of the formal sexual assault policies that colleges and universities
maintain, informal practices by higher educational institutions in response to campus
sexual assault suggest a matching concern with false accusations and a belief that women
provoke or cause rape with their bad behavior. The recent scandal at the Air Force
Academy (“AFA”) provides one example.
In the past year, more than 50 current and former AFA cadets have recounted
publicly their stories of mistreatment when they reported having been raped to campus
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officials.332 In response to these reports, the AFA often ignored the male perpetrators but
disciplined the female complainants for the minor infractions they committed on the
incidents in question, such as drinking, fraternizing with upper class cadets, or having sex
in the dorms (referring to the alleged rape itself).333
When Sharon enrolled in the AFA, older female cadets told her, “If you’re a
woman and you graduate and this hasn’t happened to you, you’re one of the select few.
So expect [rape] to happen.”334 She still did not believe she was in danger. One night in
1999, Sharon got a ride home from a movie from a male cadet.335 He pulled the car over
and raped her.336 When Sharon reported having been raped to her military superiors, two
AFA officers grilled her for four hours in a windowless basement room and told her she
was a liar.337 Thereafter they closed the case against her attacker.338
After a party drinking and playing strip poker, a male AFA cadet raped Lisa in a
bathroom.339 Lisa reported the rape to her commanding officer, and supported her claim
with testimony from witnesses who saw her crying and saw blood on the bathroom floor,
as well as a medical exam that noted several abrasions, contusions, and tears inside and
outside her vagina.340 When she went to the Commandant of students to ask that her
attacker be court-martialed, General S. Taco Gilbert III told her, “I want the cadet wing to
know that your behavior that night was wrong and unacceptable” and that, if he had his
way, he would see Lisa marching alongside her attacker as punishment.341 Lisa reported
that Gen. Gilbert told her she “didn’t have to go to that party. Didn’t have to drink that
night, didn’t have to play the card game and didn’t have to follow him back into that
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bathroom.”342 Lisa responded to him by saying, “You know what, Sir? He didn’t have to
rape me.”343 Gilbert analyzed the case in writing:
[Lisa] did engage in some very high-risk behavior that night. Again, the
behavior in no way justifies what happened to her, but when you put
yourself in situations with increased risk, you have to take increased
precautions to mitigate those risks. For example, if I walk down a dark
alley with hundred-dollar bills hanging out of my pockets, it doesn’t
justify my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the risks by
doing what I did. The behavior she engaged in is not behavior we
condone for our cadets or our officers in the Air Force. This standard isn’t
just for the Air Force Academy; it’s an Air Force standard.344
The AFA chose not to court-martial Lisa’s attacker.345 Like Harvard officials who
blamed their own inability to discipline campus rape on the victims’ “unrealistic
expectations” about the process, the Air Force working group charged with investigating
the AFA asserted that the sexual abuse scandal may have been caused by “unrealistic
expectations for prosecutions in the minds of victims.”346
As a result of the sexual abuse scandal that Sharon and Lisa’s stories typify, the
Air Force ushered in new policies at the AFA. While offering complainants “amnesty
from Academy discipline arising in connection with the alleged offense,” the new sexual
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assault policy also mandated prompt disclosure: “All allegations of sexual assault will be
reported to the officer chain of command immediately.”347 When a rape victim confers
with a therapist at the Counseling Center or calls the campus rape crisis line, then, her
name and narrative of having been sexually assaulted must immediately be reported to
the Vice Commandant of the AFA.348 The AFA thus publishes a victim’s complaint at an
early stage, requiring her to make an involuntary prompt complaint to her commanders
before she may be emotionally and psychologically ready. This rule will deter victims
from coming forward with complaints.349
About one in three civilian institutions of higher learning maintain a policy
similar to the AFA’s mandatory reporting rule.350 They maintain “designated mandatory
reporters,” school officials who are required to report (sometimes confidentially) all
instances of rape or sexual assault to the police.351 One in three campuses similarly
mandates that students who report rape or sexual assault must participate in the
adjudication process.352 These policies also deter complaints because rape victims do not
want their families or friends to find out and they distrust even confidential procedures
for mandatory reporting, where they exist.353
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a similar mentality that blames the victim for
her rape in the disciplinary infractions she engaged in on the instance in question may
also be found at some civilian institutions. Kristin, a former Boston University student,
was raped on campus one night after she drank heavily.354 She and her attacker engaged
in consensual petting but Kristin told him she did not want to engage in intercourse
because she was a virgin.355 Despite her protests, he pinned her down and penetrated
her.356 Kristin reported the rape to Boston University officials. Instead of punishing her
alleged attacker, university officials suspended Kristin and fined her $250 for violating
the school’s alcohol policy and $250 for sexually assaulting her assailant.357 Robert B.
Smith, Boston University’s general counsel, sent a letter to Kristin’s attorney, stating that
the institution:
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cannot guarantee the safety of students from their own irresponsibility or
voluntary conduct. We cannot prevent them from making poor choices.
Your client made poor choices, drank and behaved badly earlier in the
evening.358
Although the Boston University Board of Student Conduct eventually exonerated Kristin
of the sexual assault charge, it upheld her fine for underage drinking.359
Another Boston University student, Meghann was raped after smoking marijuana
with her attacker.360 When she reported the rape, she was charged with drug possession,
placed on probation, and fined $250.361 Boston University informed both Meghann and
Kristin that there was insufficient evidence to discipline the male students they accused
of rape.362
In a 2000 study on campus sexual assault adjudication, the Association for
Student Judicial Affairs found that the majority of colleges and universities did not
provide rape victims who come forward to report their victimization protection from
charges of alcohol or drug use.363 Victims at a number of colleges and universities may
be deterred from proceeding with complaints of a sexual assault if they were drinking at
the time of the incident.364 Officials at some colleges and universities even tell the victim
that, because she was drinking during the incident, no crime occurred.365 Despite the lack
of a legal basis for this assertion, officials can convince many victims that their
intoxication is a seriously mitigating circumstance in the crime.366 Catherine Bath,
program director at the nonprofit group Security on Campus, says that some colleges and
universities now employ an array of informal but aggressive tactics to decrease rape
358
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reports.367 “We’ve seen victims outright discouraged from reporting rape because
they’ve been told they could be found guilty of drinking or having sex in the dorms.”368
As a result, she says many campus victims “are afraid of even going through the campus
judicial system for fear of being sanctioned.”369
B. Motivation to Deter Complaints of Campus Sexual Assault
Campus officials may be motivated to deter complaints of campus sexual assault
for three reasons: 1) officials may not want to be bothered with most campus rapes
because they do not conform to the stereotype of violent stranger rape, 2) officials may
fear substantial negative press because federal law obligates campus administrators to
disseminate reports of campus rape widely, and 3) officials may fear civil suits from
students disciplined for campus rape. Tools derived from the discredited prompt
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions from the
criminal law of rape can allow campus administrators to deter reports of campus rape and
to dispose swiftly of those reports that do come to light.
When people think about rape, most imagine a stereotypical scenario. They
picture a black stranger jumping out of the bushes, dragging an innocent white woman
into a dark alley, beating her viciously, and raping her.370 They also imagine rape to be a
rare occurrence. These racist and sexist stereotypes are misleading and inaccurate,
particularly in terms of campus rape. Rape is not a rare occurrence. One in four women
of college age have suffered from an attempted or completed rape.371 One in five female
college students suffer a rape or attempted rape during their college years.372 Typically,
rapes are committed not by black men on white women but by men on women of the
367
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same race.373 Campus rapes rarely involve strangers; they are committed by
acquaintances: classmates, friends, fraternity brothers.374 Campus rapes tend to happen in
dorm rooms or during parties, not in the dark alleys of city streets.375 They happen to
women who are not “innocent,” but who have prior sexual experiences as varied as any
other college students their age.376 Rapes on campus rarely involve weapons, vicious
beatings, or other indisputable evidence of force.377 Acquaintance rapists do not need to
employ those tools; they ply with alcohol, pin with their body weight, and verbally and
physically coerce.378 As a result, campus acquaintance rapes often lack corroborative
evidence of a violent physical struggle.379 Often there are no witnesses to corroborate the
victim’s testimony.380 Moreover, because many believe that students will and perhaps
should engage in a certain amount of sexual experimentation at college, people may be
predisposed to believe that a questionable sexual encounter on campus was not a
transgression.
Alcohol use by college students has a sizable impact on sexual assaults on
campus.381 Increased drinking frequency and intensity are both associated with sexually
aggressive behavior by white male college students.382 In one study, 16 percent of male
college students admitted giving or encouraging the use of drugs or alcohol to obtain
sex.383 Some men stereotypically believe women who drink are more sexually
available.384 Others may use their own inebriation to justify or excuse their sexually
aggressive behavior.385 As many as 75 percent of perpetrators and 50 percent of victims
of acquaintance rapes on campus were consuming alcohol at the time of the attacks.386
Importantly, the intoxication of both parties makes people more willing to shift blame
from the perpetrator to the victim of sexual assault. When the victim and the assailant are
both moderately or highly intoxicated, individuals assign the victim significantly more
blame and the perpetrator significantly less.387
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In the typical campus rape, then, male and female classmates consume alcohol at
a party and then go to a dorm room alone. There, he pins and penetrates her, despite her
cries or alcohol-induced incapacitation. There are no strangers, no bushes, no knives, and
no innocence. Because campus rape does not conform to stereotypical rape, campus
officials often dismiss the serious psychological, emotional, and social harm it causes.388
One motivation to deter complaints of campus rape, then, is that administrators are in the
dark about the extent of the problem and fail to grasp the real harm of this kind of rape.389
Another motivation to deter complaints of campus rape is that administrators may
be trying to protect their institutional reputations, massaging campus-wide numbers to
make them look good.390 The Clery Act requires colleges and universities to provide
annual reports to the Secretary of Education on the number of sexual crimes that occur on
campus.391 The college or university must make these reports available to “all current
students and employees” as well as to prospective students.392 The Clery Act requires
when the victim was more intoxicated than the perpetrator, the perpetrator was blamed more. Participants
may blame the perpetrator in that case because he takes advantage of her intoxication. Id.
388
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colleges and universities to “maintain a daily log” of “all crimes reported to such police
or security department.”393 The log must contain the time, location, and nature of the
crime, as well as “the disposition of the complaint, if known.”394 The log must “be open
to public inspection within two business days of the initial report being made to the
department or a campus security authority.”395 Only 36.5 percent of colleges and
universities report their crime statistics in a manner fully consistent with the Clery Act.396
Because federal law requires that colleges and universities widely distribute
information about reported rapes on campus, campus officials may be more driven by a
concern for the image of their institutions than by protecting sexual assault victims on
campus.397 The Department of Justice has noted, “campus police may be influenced by
college administrators who fear that too strong an emphasis on the problem [of
acquaintance rape] may lead potential students and their parents to believe that rape
occurs more often at their college than at others.”398 As a result, campus officials may be
motivated to deter such reports.
Another reason colleges and universities may try to deter complaints of campus
rape is that they fear civil lawsuits from students disciplined as a result of these
complaints.399 In assessing students’ rights vis-à-vis campus disciplinary proceedings,
courts have held that students have the due process right to notice and the opportunity to
be heard before they can be expelled from public universities.400 However, they have few
due process rights against private universities.401 In private college and university
settings, courts have mostly applied contract theories to review student disciplinary
proceedings, sometimes incorporating a quasi-requirement of “fundamental” or “basic”
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fairness.402 In general, courts have concluded that private universities must comply with
their own procedures and act reasonably.403
There are about thirty- five written decisions in state and federal courts involving
students who have sued their colleges or universities as a result of being disciplined for
sexual assault. Ordinarily, disciplined students are only successful when colleges or
universities are found to have deviated from the procedures outlined in their own
disciplinary policies. When a student wins such a lawsuit, a court then orders that the
college or university grant the student a new disciplinary hearing untainted by the
procedural anomaly. Two examples are representative.
Travis Marshall sued the State University of New York College at Old Westbury
(“SUNY”) after he was expelled for rape.404 The SUNY disciplinary code provided for a
hearing by a Judicial Review Committee and appeal to the Judicial Council.405 The
disciplinary code indicated that no person “shall serve simultaneously on the Judicial
Council and the Judicial Review Committee;”406 however, one associate dean at SUNY
served on both Marshall’s Judicial Review Committee and his Judicial Council.407
Marshall sued on the basis of this procedural irregularity and the courts found that
the dean’s dual service violated Marshall’s due process rights.408 The New York
Supreme Court explained, “The violation by an agency of its own regulations even where
they are more generous than the Constitution requires may, in and of itself, constitute a
violation of a student’s due process rights.”409 The court then annulled Marshall’s
expulsion and remanded the matter for a hearing before a new judicial council that was
properly constituted according to SUNY’s code of judicial conduct.410
A Middlebury College student accused Ethan Fellheimer of rape.411 Middlebury
told Fellheimer that the college disciplinary committee would investigate him on the
charge of rape, but after finding him not guilty of rape, the committee adjudicated him
guilty of “disrespect of persons” and suspended him for a year for “engaging in
inappropriate sexual activity.”412 The Middlebury College Handbook for Students
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indicated that the committee would “state the nature of the charges with sufficient
particularity to permit the accused to meet the charges.”413 Fellheimer sued Middlebury
College in federal court for breach of contract and violation of due process. The District
Court determined that Middlebury had created a contractual obligation that required it to
“conduct its hearings in a manner consistent with the terms of the Handbook.”414 The
court concluded that Middlebury breached its contract with Fellheimer because it
provided him notice only of the rape charge and did not warn him of the “disrespect of
persons” charge.415 Middlebury’s deviation from the procedures outlined in its
Handbook rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair so the court granted Fellheimer’s
motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.416
If colleges and universities scrupulously follow their own procedures, they have
little to worry about in terms of suits from disciplined students. They should perhaps be
more concerned with federal civil suits when they receive and ignore complaints from
women who were sexually assaulted. Title IX requires:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.417
Title IX may provide sexually victimized students with a cause of action against colleges
and universities that know about and fail to redress sexually hostile environments caused
by peers. Federal courts are only beginning to articulate the contours of the application
of Title IX to colleges and universities;418 however, the claim that colleges may be liable
to sexually victimized students has enjoyed some success.419
IV.

Freedom from the Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions
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As we have seen, new versions of the prompt complaint rule, the corroboration
requirement, and cautionary instructions are now infecting disciplinary proceedings in the
academic world. The prompt complaint requirement unduly influences the timing and
mandatory reporting rules that various colleges and universities have enacted for claims
of sexual misconduct. Harvard’s new policy indicates that a “timely” complaint is
ordinarily required. Some top schools suggest that a prompt complaint of sexual assault
is necessary; others mandate it. Those that are silent on the issue may still discourage
complaints on the basis that they are not reported immediately.
Additionally, the Air Force Academy’s new sexual assault policy mandates
prompt disclosure of any allegation to superior officers: “All allegations of sexual assault
will be reported to the officer chain of command immediately.”420 One in three civilian
institutions of higher learning employs “designated mandatory reporters,” school officials
who are required to report (sometimes confidentially) instances of rape or sexual assault
to the police.421
The corroboration requirement from the criminal law of rape now influences the
amount of evidence of sexual misconduct colleges and universities require for a violation
of their disciplinary codes. Harvard adopted a strong corroboration requirement in its
formal sexual misconduct policy that it recently converted to a quieter demand: “students
are asked to provide as much information as possible to support their allegations.”
Harvard has indicated that it will not take disciplinary action against those students
accused of rape unless the complainant provides such support. Other schools may soon
follow Harvard’s lead.
Four out of five campus disciplinary codes do not contain a standard of proof for
the finding of sexual assault.422 This deficiency does not prevent an institution from
informally holding sexual assault complaints to a higher standard of proof than other
disciplinary complaints. Because of the traditional bias against those who lodge claims
of sexual assault generally, as well as the bias against those who bring claims of campus
acquaintance rape specifically, there is reason to suspect that a double standard might
infect the way some campus officials treat complaints of sexual assault.
The cautionary instruction from the criminal law has paved the way for campuses
to react with extra suspicion to reports of sexual assault. Sexual assault is widespread on
college campuses yet it is vastly under-reported. Victims who come forward have been
subjected to intense counter-scrutiny and even scorn from both their peers and campus
officials to whom they reported having been violated. One manifestation of this counterscrutiny is the counter charges filed against victims who come forward with allegations
of rape. Both the Air Force Academy and Boston University have struggled with
substantial negative publicity regarding the practice of disciplining students who come
forward with allegations of rape on the basis of other (often alcohol or drug-related)
disciplinary infractions. A majority of colleges and universities do not provide rape
victims who come forward to report their victimization amnesty from charges of alcohol
or drug use.423
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As a result, I propose the following provisions for campus sexual assault policies.
My proposal is not a comprehensive policy on sexual assault; it is simply a set of three
model provisions in areas of particular concern, given the influence of the prompt
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions from the
criminal law of rape.
1. Complaint Timing. Victims are encouraged to report instances of sexual
assault to campus authorities anonymously, confidentially, or publicly at any
time. Students may initiate disciplinary proceedings on the basis of sexual
assault against any student currently enrolled at [applicable institution’s
name].
2. Standard of Proof. The standard of proof for a violation of the disciplinary
code for sexual assault shall be a preponderance of the evidence. This
standard requires that the complainant prove that an allegation is more
probable than not. A student who complains of sexual assault need not
present additional evidence to corroborate the complaint. The complainant’s
testimony alone may be sufficient to prove that an allegation is more probable
than not.
3. Amnesty for Disciplinary Infractions. Ordinarily, a student who reports an
instance of sexual assault to campus authorities shall be granted amnesty for
other disciplinary infractions committed by that student on the instance in
question.
The first model provision on complaint timing would abolish the influence of the
criminal law’s prompt complaint requirement by encouraging reports of sexual assault at
any time. It emphasizes that the complainant can make a report anonymously,
confidentially, or publicly, which would abolish non-confidential mandatory reporting
rules in place at some institutions of higher learning. The provision would grant the
raped student, who has often had her sense of control destroyed, control over the amount
of information she will reveal to authorities in terms of her identity and experience. The
first provision would also allow school disciplinary boards to curtail their jurisdiction in
sexual assault cases to those circumstances that most affect campus life by authorizing
disciplinary proceedings only against those who are currently enrolled.
The second model provision would abolish the influence that the corroboration
requirement has on campus sexual assault policies and procedures by stating that a
complainant need not present additional evidence to corroborate her complaint. No
external corroboration of the complainant’s testimony should be required at any stage of
the process. As we have seen, acquaintance rape victims often have few eyewitnesses,
bruises, or other evidence to corroborate their assaults.424 None should be required. A
credible narrative that convinces the fact finder should be enough for a disciplinary
adjudication in favor of the complainant.
The second model provision also prevents institutions from holding sexual assault
complaints to a higher standard of proof than other disciplinary complaints. The burden
424

See supra notes 377-379 and accompanying text.

59

of proof for a disciplinary violation on campus should not mimic the criminal law’s
standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The privilege of an education from
an institution of higher learning should be denied to students on evidence less serious
than would subject them to criminal sanctions. Being thrown out of the Air Force
Academy is not the same as being thrown into the brig. It should be easier to be expelled
from Harvard than to be placed in a prison in the state of Massachusetts.
Since eight of ten sexual assault policies on university campuses that include a
standard of proof employ a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, I have included
that level of proof as the appropriate one here. Preponderance of the evidence, the
burden of proof in civil cases, requires “evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.”425 A small minority of
campuses maintains a “clear and convincing” standard of proof for disciplinary
proceedings. Clear and convincing evidence requires proof of a “reasonable certainty” or
high probability—something more than preponderance of the evidence, but less that
beyond a reasonable doubt.426 Should an institution of higher learning maintain a clear
and convincing standard of proof for other disciplinary infractions, it would be
appropriate to include the same standard of proof in this provision.
Assuming that an institution adopts “preponderance of the evidence,” such a
standard would allocate burdens to each side in a disciplinary action for sexual assault the
same way that the burdens are allocated in a regular civil suit. As in a civil suit, it is up
to the decision-makers to assess the credibility of the witnesses. If the only evidence
submitted is the testimonies of the complainant and the accused (the so-called “he
said/she said” circumstance), and the complainant’s story is more credible than the
accused student’s story, the complainant should prevail. If the narratives are equally
credible, the accused student should prevail because the complainant would not have
proven that the sexual assault was more probable than not.
The second model provision would also abolish the influence that the cautionary
instruction has on campus sexual assault policies and procedures. The testimony of a
student who brings a claim of sexual assault against another student should not, merely
because of the nature of that charge, be treated in any different manner than the testimony
of a complaining witness in any other case. The testimony should not be subject to extra
scrutiny or additional burdens beyond that which regularly attend the evaluation of
student charges. This analysis is consonant with state criminal codes that have abolished
the traditional cautionary instruction in rape cases. South Dakota’s criminal law states:
“The testimony of the complaining witness in a trial for a charge of a sex offense … may
not, merely because of the nature of that charge, be treated in any different manner than
the testimony of a complaining witness in any other criminal case.”427 Pennsylvania’s
criminal code is similar: “The credibility of a complainant of an offense under this
chapter shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility of a complainant of
any other crime. … No instruction shall be given cautioning the jury to view the
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complainant’s testimony in any other way than that in which all complainants’ testimony
is viewed.”428
The third and final model provision curtails the ability of campus sexual officials
to counter-scrutinize students who come forward with allegations of rape. As we have
seen, most colleges and universities do not provide raped students with immunity from
disciplinary charges related to the incident in question. This provision grants those who
complain to campus authorities of sexual assault routine amnesty for the (usually alcohol
or drug-related) disciplinary infractions they engaged in on the instance in question. The
term “ordinarily” simply allows the campus some discretion to pursue disciplinary
infractions related to the complainant’s actions on the instance in question if those actions
were particularly egregious or otherwise extraordinary. In the normal course of events,
however, campus authorities should not pursue alcohol infractions against college
students who are raped.
Some might worry that such an amnesty provision would create an incentive for
false rape complaints. To assuage such a concern, one might look to the practice of
police departments that receive complaints of crimes from the general public. Police
departments tend to ignore the relatively minor criminal infractions that a woman who
reports a rape engaged in on the instance in question. If a woman comes forward to
report that she was raped by a man with whom she smoked marijuana on the instance in
question, police do not respond by charging her with possession of a controlled
substance. They pursue the rape report. Police understand that women are very unlikely
to report rape if police prosecuted those women for any criminal offenses engaged in on
the instance in question. As a result, the third model provision removes a powerful tool
campus administrators can use to deter and dismiss complaints of sexual assault.
Conclusion
Danielle Bauer won five academic scholarships to attend Erskine College, a
small, private, Presbyterian institution in Due West, South Carolina.429 In the fall of
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2002, she enrolled in her first semester of classes. One afternoon in November, her
chemistry tutor Mark Ridgeway asked her to come to his dorm room and, after she
arrived, they began kissing. He asked Danielle for sex but she refused. He then
maneuvered his way on top of her and leaned his shoulder deeply into her neck. Danielle
lost consciousness and he raped her.430
Danielle went to the hospital emergency room that night. She asked for a rape kit
examination, but the attending nurse told her that the hospital would only perform such
an exam if Danielle knew for sure that she was going to press charges against her
assailant.431 Danielle, confused and traumatized, was not sure what to do. Although the
attending nurse gave Danielle the phone number of the Rape Crisis hotline, she refused to
give her an exam.432
According to the psychologist she had to see as a result of the attack, Danielle
suffered “significant psychological distress and a loss of daily functioning.”433 Although
Danielle had “no previous history of depression or anxiety,” she suffered from “a drastic
decline in her academic, emotional, and social functioning immediately following the
rape attack.”434 She “experienced suicidal thoughts, repetitive intrusive thoughts about
the assault, self-mutilating behavior, feeling dirty and worthless, severe sleep disturbance,
anxiety attacks, shaking, crying spells, weight loss, impaired concentration, mood swings,
intense anger, loss of self-confidence, and social withdrawal.”435
When Danielle mustered the courage to report her rape to Erskine College
officials, they ignored the situation for months, insisting that they could not be expected
to handle a sexual assault case.436 It was not until Danielle reported the rape to the local
police department in April of 2003 and her assailant was indicted for first-degree sexual
assault that Erskine officials relented to Danielle’s repeated requests for a school
hearing.437
At the hearing on the matter, Erskine officials found her assailant not guilty of
sexual assault. They then put Danielle on trial, introducing witnesses who said she was a
sorority girl who wore provocative clothing and drank.438 A dean then argued that
Danielle had perhaps made up the whole story because she was doing poorly in a biology
class and wanted a medical leave from school to maintain her scholarships.439 Officials
then found both Danielle and her assailant guilty of “sexual misconduct.”440
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Danielle appealed. Her first appeal affirmed the decisions made the hearing.441
Danielle appealed again. At this final appeal, the president of Erskine College, John
Carson, affirmed the determination that her assailant was not guilty of sexual assault.442
Carson noted, “neither I nor any other human being can look within the heart of another
human being let alone two human beings and determine what motives are there, we can
only look at the limited evidence which can be produced.”443
Carson then decided to reverse the sexual misconduct findings against both
parties. He felt the need to emphasize, however, that he was “especially grieved” to have
to do so.444 Referring to the kissing that preceded the rape, he noted, “I can in no way
condone the sexual involvement which was consensual up to the point of debate between
the two parties.”445 Carson wrote to Danielle:
I grieve that this decision is contrary to my personal beliefs with respect to
upholding a standard of conduct which is appropriate between a man and a
woman and contrary to the standard of conduct of the Erskine community.
Your actions not only affect you but also every member of the Erskine
community—whether student, faculty, or staff. I pray that all of us will
consider the serious nature of our decisions and seek God’s forgiveness.446
One might be tempted to conclude that Danielle’s story is exceptional. But other
colleges and universities have responded to women’s reports of having been raped by
charging them with a variety of disciplinary infractions, making Danielle’s story far from
unique. Set aside their sanctimony and Erskine College officials echo General Gilbert at
the Air Force Academy, who insisted:
[I]f I walk down a dark alley with hundred-dollar bills hanging out of my
pockets, it doesn’t justify my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly
increased the risks by doing what I did. The behavior [Lisa] engaged in is
not behavior we condone for our cadets or our officers in the Air Force.447
Officials at both institutions mimic the Boston University’s general counsel Robert Smith
who declared that his school:
cannot guarantee the safety of students from their own irresponsibility or
voluntary conduct. We cannot prevent them from making poor choices.
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[Kristin] made poor choices, drank and behaved badly earlier in the
evening.448
Each of these officials, deeply suspicious of women who allege sexual assault, acts as if
chastising Potiphar’s wife. He seeks to place the blame for the incident squarely on the
woman’s shoulders. She failed to personify a model of sexual virtue and so should be
held responsible for the attack. She failed to report the rape to the police promptly
enough. She failed to present hard, corroborating evidence. School officials cannot be
expected to plumb the depths of the human heart. They “can only look at the limited
evidence which can be produced.”449
The prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary
instructions in the criminal law of rape evinced the belief that, because women lie about
rape, men accused of it need special legal protection beyond that which the law affords
defendants accused of other crimes. Officials at some colleges and universities have now
adopted similar beliefs about female students who come forward with allegations of
campus rape. Importing new versions of these ancient policies from the criminal law
institutionalizes their grave skepticism of women. It is important to connect these
retrograde policies with their discredited past and reject them both in the remaining state
laws in which they withstand old age and in campus disciplinary procedures in which
they are just being born.
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